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Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual 
Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
DAVID C. HOLMAN 
Confusion reigns in federal courts over whether crimes qualify as “violent felonies” 
for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).  The ACCA requires a fifteen-
year minimum sentence for felons convicted of possessing a firearm who have three prior 
convictions for violent felonies.  Many offenders receive the ACCA’s mandatory minimum 
sentence of fifteen years based on judges’ guesses that their prior crimes could be 
committed in a violent manner—instead of based on the statutory crimes for which they 
were actually convicted.  Offenders who do not deserve a minimum sentence of fifteen years 
may receive it anyway. 
The courts’ application of the ACCA is also underinclusive.  Although the ACCA 
defines “violent felony” to include all crimes “involving conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of bodily injury to another,” a 2008 Supreme Court decision has drastically 
narrowed the so-called residual clause.  Begay v. United States held that crimes fall under 
the residual clause only if they are “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” as a matter of law.  
This imprecise, extra-statutory formula has resulted in the exclusion of some seriously risky 
crimes of recklessness and negligence, and created tension with the nearly identical “crime 
of violence” definition in the career offender sentencing guideline. 
This Article is the first to survey ACCA jurisprudence after Begay and the Court’s 
2009 decision in Chambers v. United States and to detail the conflict between these 
decisions, the text of the ACCA, and the Court’s prior precedent.  This Article offers lower 
courts a way to apply the ACCA’s residual clause with greater respect for the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, the statutory text, and precedent.  First, courts should 
narrowly construe Begay’s requirement of “purposeful” conduct to exclude strict liability 
crimes from the residual clause but include crimes of negligence and recklessness.  Second, 
courts should read Begay’s “aggressive” requirement as a rhetorical flourish without any 
meaningful distinction from its “violent” requirement.  Third, despite Begay’s apparent 
invitation to do otherwise, courts should strictly follow the “categorical approach” as set 
forth in Taylor v. United States.  The net result of these three steps would be a greater 
faithfulness to the text of the ACCA: courts applying the residual clause would include only 
those crimes whose elements require violent conduct while excluding those crimes whose 
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Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual 
Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
DAVID C. HOLMAN * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Involuntary manslaughter is not a violent felony.  Possession of a 
dangerous weapon is inherently violent.  Driving away from the police is 
necessarily aggressive.  Welcome to the bizarre world of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”),1 brought about by a poorly drafted statute and a 
conflicting morass of Supreme Court and appellate case law.  Essentially, 
the ACCA requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence for repeat offenders 
convicted of possessing a firearm who have three prior convictions for 
violent felonies.2  In defining which crimes qualify as violent felonies, the 
ACCA includes any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”3  In Begay v. United 
States, the Supreme Court limited this residual clause to crimes that 
involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct.4 
The case of Melvin Spells illustrates the often whimsical application of 
the ACCA after Begay.  When a police officer saw Spells driving without 
wearing his seatbelt, the officer turned on his lights to pull Spells over.5  
Spells refused to pull over, earning him a state felony conviction for 
fleeing law enforcement.6  Years later, Spells faced federal sentencing for 
being a felon in possession of a firearm, among other crimes.7  A felon-in-
possession conviction would normally carry a maximum sentence of ten 
                                                                                                                          
* Former law clerk to Hon. Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit.  J.D. 2009, William & Mary School of Law; M.A. 2004, The University of Chicago; B.A. 
2003, Providence College.  Many thanks are due to Jane Elizabeth Holman, my patient wife and truly 
indispensible editor, and to James Bilsborrow, Julie Blake, Steven Holman, Professor Paul Marcus, 
Christian Miller, George Mocsary, Professor Jack Morton, Professor Michael O’Hear, Anupama 
Sawkar, Arpan Sura, Robert Tepper, and David Tyler for their helpful comments.  Any mistakes are 
my own. 
1 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1401–02, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)).  Congress first passed the ACCA in 1984, and amended it to its 
present form in 1986.  For an in-depth review of the legislative history, see James G. Levine, Note, The 
Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545–48 (2009). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
3 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).   
4 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2008).   
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 744. 
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years in prison.8  But the sentencing court found that Spells had three prior 
convictions for violent felonies, including his conviction for fleeing law 
enforcement, making him eligible for the ACCA’s mandatory minimum 
sentence of fifteen years in prison.9  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that Spells’s conviction for fleeing law enforcement entailed 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as a matter of law, as required 
by Begay.10  The appellate court admitted that the statutory elements of the 
crime did not require violent or aggressive conduct for a conviction.  
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the crime is legally violent and 
aggressive because the offender’s flight “calls the officer to give chase, and 
. . . dares the officer to needlessly endanger himself in pursuit.”11  This 
judicial reasoning made the difference of at least five years in prison for 
Melvin Spells.  Similar reasoning has concluded that crimes such as the 
mere possession of a dangerous weapon and larceny are inherently violent, 
leaving circuits split over whether certain crimes are violent felonies.12  
The battle over the application of the ACCA is fought over whether a 
defendant’s three prior convictions fall within the meaning of “violent 
felony” or “serious drug offense,” therefore triggering the ACCA.  Under 
the text of the ACCA, a felony is violent if it fulfills any one of three 
conditions: (1) it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another,” (2) it “is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives,” or (3) it “otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”13  This Article focuses on the contentious “otherwise” or 
“residual” clause—the ill-defined third option.  At sentencing, federal 
prosecutors often take a broad view and argue that physically stealing from 
a person,14 criminal trespass to a dwelling,15 and fleeing law enforcement16 
should all qualify as violent felonies under the residual clause.  
Defendants, of course, prefer a narrower construction.  Despite frequent 
litigation, a standard definition of a “violent felony” has proven elusive.  
                                                                                                                          
8 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 
9 Spells, 537 F.3d at 745.  
10 Id. at 751, 753–54. 
11 Id. (“An individual’s purposeful decision to flee an officer in a vehicle when told to stop, 
reflects that if that same individual were in possession of a firearm and asked to stop by police, they 
would have a greater propensity to use that firearm in an effort to evade arrest.”). 
12 See infra Part V.C (discussing circuits’ analysis of sexual crimes against children) and V.D.2 
(discussing circuits’ analysis of fleeing law enforcement).   
13 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2006).   
14 United States v. Hennecke, 590 F.3d 619, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2010) (addressing a Missouri 
conviction for physically stealing from another in violation of MO. REV. STAT. § 569.030, which 
requires proof of the use of force). 
15 United States v. Corner, 588 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 2009) (addressing Wisconsin conviction 
for criminal trespass to a dwelling in violation of WIS. STAT. § 943.14).  
16 Spells, 537 F.3d at 749–50 (addressing Indiana conviction for fleeing law enforcement in 
violation of IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)).   
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The residual clause is problematic because lower federal courts are torn 
between the text of the ACCA, a complex analysis known as the 
“categorical approach,” and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Begay 
v. United States, which requires that a prior conviction be “purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive” to fall under the residual clause.17  This Article is 
the first to survey the residual clause’s various problems after Begay, 
particularly the conflict between the text of the residual clause, the 
categorical approach, and Begay.18    
Federal courts must reconcile two nearly contradictory strains of 
ACCA case law.  The first strain has mandated a “categorical approach” in 
determining whether a particular crime constitutes a violent felony.  Under 
the categorical approach, courts may examine only the fact of the prior 
conviction, the statutory elements of that offense, and, in rare cases, the 
charging documents, jury instructions, or plea agreements.19  In other 
words, the prior conviction must be a violent felony as a matter of law—
not just a felony committed in a violent manner in that particular case.   
For example, state statutes defining the crime of witness tampering 
may not require any violent act: to commit the crime, a person needs only 
to induce a witness to testify falsely or not testify.20  The person convicted 
of witness tampering may have committed the crime in a violent way, like 
killing the witness in order to prevent his testimony.  But that violence 
does not make the crime legally or categorically violent because the 
government never had to prove an element of violence to secure a 
conviction.  Consequently, a conviction under one of these statutes, even 
where a witness had been killed, would not fall within the residual clause 
and, accordingly, the defendant would not be subject to heightened 
sentencing under the ACCA.  The categorical approach restricts a 
sentencing court’s consideration of prior convictions to those elements 
actually proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the 
defendant, thereby protecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.21 
                                                                                                                          
17 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008). 
18 Begay’s interpretation of the ACCA has received no substantial coverage in legal journals 
except for brief case comments and reviews of the 2007–2008 Supreme Court Term.  More generally, 
the most recent treatment of the ACCA is discussed in Levine, supra note 1, at 547 (assessing the 
ACCA’s implications).  See also Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, Categorical, But Incomplete: 
The Need for a New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1409 (2008) (arguing for a uniform generic standard of the 
sentencing requirement without discussing Begay). 
19 See infra Part III.A (explaining the categorical approach in greater detail).  
20 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-707 (2009) (defining the crime of tampering with a 
witness or victim); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.050 (2006) (defining same); N.H. REV. STAT. § 641:5 
(2007) (defining same).  But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (proscribing killing, using 
physical force or the threat of physical force, or attempted killing or use of force with intent to prevent, 
influence, or delay testimony).   
21 See infra note 47 and accompanying text.  
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The second strain of case law limits the scope of the residual clause to 
crimes similar to the crimes enumerated in the preceding clause.  
According to Begay, the enumerated crimes “limit[] the crimes that [the 
residual clause] covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as 
in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves.”22  Crimes are similar 
in kind if they—like the enumerated crimes—“typically involve 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”23  Theoretically, Begay is 
perfectly compatible with the categorical approach.  Courts simply 
determine whether the statutory elements of the prior offense of conviction 
require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.  But the practical 
application of Begay is different for two reasons.   
First, Begay and its offspring contain language undermining the 
categorical approach.  The Court suggested that lower courts should 
examine the “ordinary” or “typical” commission of the statutory offense.  
But how a crime is typically committed may vary from what the statutory 
elements actually require for conviction.24  The example of Melvin Spells 
illustrates this conflict.  The Seventh Circuit may have correctly concluded 
that the crime of fleeing law enforcement typically involves violence 
because the pursuing officer will often give chase, risking harm to himself 
and bystanders.  But violent conduct is not required in order to convict 
under the statute.  Mr. Spells may have been driving on a deserted street.  
Or Mr. Spells, while refusing to stop, may have never exceeded the speed 
limit and may have obeyed all traffic laws.  Improbable?  Perhaps.  But 
possible.  Begay introduced another subjective consideration that veers 
from the statute and the categorical approach: it instructed lower courts to 
consider whether the prior crime is one that indicates the criminal is likely 
to use a weapon to harm a victim in the future.25  This consideration also 
creates tension with the categorical approach. 
Second, some courts have resisted Begay’s newly fashioned 
requirement that violent felonies be purposeful, violent, and aggressive.  
Instead of Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement, 
some courts continue to apply the unglossed statutory requirement that the 
                                                                                                                          
22 Begay, 553 U.S. at 143; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) (“The 
specific offenses enumerated in clause (ii) [of the ACCA] provide one baseline from which to measure 
whether other similar conduct ‘otherwise . . . presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.’” 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006))). 
23 Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 For example, a person may have killed someone while engaging in some other non-violent 
criminal activity, but only been convicted of the latter crime because evidence of one element was 
lacking with respect to the former.   
25 Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (“[Purposeful, violent, and aggressive] conduct is such that it makes 
more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.  
Crimes committed in such a purposeful, violent, and aggressive manner are ‘potentially more 
dangerous when firearms are involved.’” (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (2006) 
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part))).  
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prior crime pose a serious potential risk of physical injury.26  Other courts 
use Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement, but apply it 
to the “typical” or “ordinary case” with reasoning at odds with the 
categorical approach.27   
This Article aims to help lower courts resolve the conflict between 
Begay and the categorical approach by identifying the major pitfalls in 
applying the ACCA after Begay and suggesting the ideal post-Begay 
application of the categorical approach.  Part II examines the text of the 
ACCA and presents some basic principles in interpreting the residual 
clause.  Part III explains Supreme Court precedent regarding the ACCA, 
focusing on Taylor v. United States,28 James v. United States,29 Begay, and, 
most recently, Chambers v. United States.30  Part IV exhibits several of 
Begay’s various inherent problems.  Part V sets out four chief difficulties 
in implementing Begay.   
Finally, Part VI proposes an application of the ACCA that is more 
consistent with the statutory text and the categorical approach.  First, 
courts should narrowly construe Begay’s mens rea holding and read it as 
excluding only strict liability crimes from the residual clause while 
including crimes of negligence and recklessness.  Second, courts should 
read Begay’s “aggressive” requirement as a rhetorical flourish without any 
meaningful distinction from “violent.”  Third, despite Begay’s apparent 
invitation to do otherwise, courts should strictly follow the categorical 
approach and apply the residual clause to only those crimes with elements 
that require the underlying conduct be violent while excluding those crimes 
with elements that do not require violence or any mens rea. 
II.  THE TEXT OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 
As stated above, the ACCA31 mandates a sentence of at least fifteen 
years in prison for felons convicted of possessing a firearm and who have 
at least three prior convictions for a violent felony, a serious drug offense, 
or both.32  For purposes of the ACCA, a “violent felony” is any crime 
                                                                                                                          
26 See infra Part V.A. 
27 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
28 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  
29 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
30 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). 
31 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1401-02, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)).  
32 Section 924(e)(1) states:  
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three 
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different 
from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less 
than fifteen years . . . .   
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).    
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punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that “(i) has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use 
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .”33   
The first clause of the violent felony definition is relatively 
straightforward in its application.  Either a crime contains one of those 
elements or it does not.  For example, any kind of attempted or completed 
homicide or assault (excluding felony murder) has as an element the use or 
attempted use of force.  The second clause is more difficult for two 
reasons.  First, the ACCA does not define the enumerated crimes.  While 
those crimes are familiar concepts in American law, states may define 
them differently.34  Second, the residual or “otherwise” clause of clause (ii) 
is deceptive.  At first blush, the residual clause seems sweeping—it 
includes any other crime that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury.35  Statutory rules of construction, however, limit its scope.  Where 
general words follow specific ones in a list, the canon of ejusdem generis 
suggests that “the general words are construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific 
words.”36  Such is the case in the ACCA.  The residual clause should 
therefore include only crimes that are “similar in nature” to burglary, 
arson, extortion, or crimes involving use of explosives.37   
                                                                                                                          
33 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
34 The variety of state burglary statutes required the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 
495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990), to craft a generic definition of burglary.  See supra notes 41–44 and 
accompanying text. 
35 This was the Government’s position in Begay. 
36 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 253–54 
(2000) (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 188 
(Norman Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992)).  Despite some scholars’ criticism of canons in the mid-twentieth 
century, “a large and growing number of academics . . . now believe in the utility of canons of 
constructions . . . and . . . the newly faithful cover a broad philosophical spectrum” from Scalia to 
Sunstein.  John F. Manning, Legal Realism & The Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D. 283, 284 (2002); 
see,  e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 407–08 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that ejusdem generis limits FCC’s authority under general provision, 
“[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest 
to carry out the provisions of this chapter,” to interstate and foreign communications because the 
preceding section pertained “exclusively to ‘interstate or foreign communication by wire or  
radio . . . .’” (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(a))).   
37 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) (“The specific offenses enumerated in clause 
(ii) provide one baseline from which to measure whether other similar conduct ‘otherwise . . . presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii))); see also Begay v. 
United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150–51 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court is correct that the 
clause . . . signifies a similarity between the enumerated and unenumerated crimes.”); James, 550 U.S. 
at 218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he most natural reading of the statute is that committing one of the 
enumerated crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives) is one way to commit a 
crime ‘involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’; and that 
other ways of committing a crime of that character similarly constitute ‘violent felon[ies].’”).  But see 
Begay, 553 U.S. at 162 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The statute does not say that these offenses must present 
at least as much risk as the enumerated offenses.”).  
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Finding similarities across those four crimes is a challenge.  The 
Model Penal Code’s definitions of burglary, arson, and extortion do not 
contain any common element besides specific intent.38  The use of 
explosives, however, “may involve merely negligent or reckless 
conduct,”39 a feature that eliminates the one commonality of the first three 
crimes.  Although the enumerated crimes lack any common elements, they 
are all serious crimes with potential for violent consequences.  Burglary 
could lead to a confrontation with the occupant or owner of the target 
structure.  Also, because burglary requires “breaking and entering,” it 
involves violence to property.40  Arson may entail the destruction of a 
building and a great risk of harm to persons.  Extortion may involve theft 
by the threat of violence.  The use of explosives could harm persons or 
property, especially if used recklessly.  Without any other obvious threads 
connecting the four enumerated crimes, courts have had to take an active 
role in clarifying the residual clause’s ambiguity.   
III.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING THE ACCA 
The Supreme Court’s ACCA jurisprudence addresses two main issues: 
(1) what information courts may consider in determining whether a crime 
is a violent felony, and (2) which crimes fall under the residual clause.  
A.  Taylor and James: The Categorical Approach Meets the Residual 
Clause 
The Supreme Court has mandated a “categorical approach” for 
determining whether a crime qualifies as a “violent felony” under the 
ACCA.  Taylor v. United States41 addressed whether a Missouri conviction 
for second-degree burglary qualified as the “burglary” listed among the 
                                                                                                                          
38 MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (“A person is guilty of arson, a felony of the second degree, if he 
starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of: (a) destroying a building or occupied structure 
of another; or (b) destroying or damaging any property, whether his own or another’s, to collect 
insurance for such loss.”); id. § 221.1 (“A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or 
occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime 
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to 
enter.”); id. § 223.4 (“A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by 
threatening to: (1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal offense; or (2) accuse 
anyone of a criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt 
or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action as an official, or 
cause an official to take or withhold action; or (5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other 
collective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in 
whose interest the actor purports to act; or (6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or 
information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or (7) inflict any other harm which would 
not benefit the actor.”).  
39 Begay, 553 U.S. at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1.   
41 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
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ACCA’s enumerated crimes.42  After establishing a generic definition of 
“burglary” for ACCA purposes,43 Taylor specified how lower courts 
should determine if a state burglary offense qualifies as a “burglary” under 
the ACCA.  The ACCA, the Taylor Court held, “generally requires the trial 
court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of 
the prior offense.”44  The sentencing court may look beyond the fact of the 
conviction “in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required 
to find all the elements of generic burglary.”45  For example, a conviction 
based on a burglary statute that can be violated in multiple ways—such as 
either entering a vehicle or entering a building—is a violent felony only if 
the jury had to find that the defendant entered a building, thereby meeting 
the Court’s generic burglary definition.46  In other words, the categorical 
approach restricts a sentencing court’s fact-finding to the existence of a 
prior conviction and its statutory elements.  When necessary, the court may 
use charging documents to examine which part of a disjunctive statute the 
defendant violated, but not how she violated it.  That secondary step, where 
permitted, is restricted to the “indictment or information and jury 
instructions . . . .”47  In the case of a guilty plea, because no trial occurred, 
the sentencing court may examine “the terms of a plea agreement or 
transcript of colloquy between the judge and defendant in which the factual 
basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant . . . .”48   
Consider the burglary example above.  If the fact of conviction does 
not reveal whether the defendant entered a building or entered a vehicle, 
then the sentencing court may review the charging documents, or any plea 
agreement or colloquy.  If those documents show that he was charged with 
entering a building, then the categorical approach allows the court to find 
that he committed burglary under the ACCA.  If, however, those 
documents do not clarify which subsection the defendant violated, the 
sentencing court may go no further.  The crime cannot constitute a 
predicate crime for purposes of the ACCA.49   
                                                                                                                          
42 Id. at 577–79. 
43 Id. at 592–93 (defining burglary generically as “independent of the labels employed by the 
various States’ criminal codes”); see also id. at 598 (“Although the exact formulations vary, the 
generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or 
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”).  
The Court has not yet generically defined the other enumerated crimes. 




48 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 
49 The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the restriction on judicial fact-finding for 
sentencing purposes since Taylor.  See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007) (“[W]e 
consider whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the 
residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.”); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491–92 (2000) (striking down a mandatory sentencing enhancement as 
unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth Amendment).  Because fact-finding by judges, instead of 
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 The categorical approach’s relative simplicity does not appear to have 
survived its application to the residual clause.  In James v. United States, 
the Court addressed whether a Florida conviction for attempted burglary 
qualifies as a violent felony.50  Although attempted burglary did not meet 
Taylor’s generic definition of burglary for the ACCA, the Court held that it 
could still constitute a violent felony under the residual clause.51  In so 
holding, however, the Court confused the analysis in two ways.  First, it 
proposed a broader reading of the residual clause than the canon of 
ejusdem generis may allow.  It acknowledged that the scope of the residual 
clause was limited by the preceding enumerated crimes:  
The specific offenses enumerated in clause (ii) provide one 
baseline from which to measure whether other similar 
conduct “otherwise . . . presents a serious potential risk of 
                                                                                                                          
juries, increased defendants’ sentences, the sentencing scheme at issue in Apprendi violated the right to 
trial by jury.  Id.  The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury of one’s peers find each fact 
necessary to the conviction and sentence.  Indeed, Apprendi offered this guidance: “Other than the fact 
of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490.  The 
Supreme Court extended Apprendi’s key holding to state sentencing guidelines in Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), and federal Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 230–32 (2005), and has affirmed it in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), and 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).  For the argument that the Sentencing Guidelines violate the 
Sixth Amendment, see generally David C. Holman, Note, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker, 
Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 271 
(2008). 
Just as judges cannot rely on facts not found by a jury to increase a mandatory sentence under 
Apprendi and Booker, they cannot do so to determine whether a prior conviction is a violent felony.  
Apprendi and the categorical approach require judges to use only the fact of the prior conviction and 
the specific elements found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.  Whether a prior conviction is a 
“violent felony” is a legal question that would not ordinarily implicate the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right.  That inquiry remains a legal question so long as the judge considers only the law.  But if the 
judge deviates from the categorical approach and considers aspects of the crime not found by the jury, 
not admitted by the defendant, or which do not constitute elements of the crime, then that veers into 
factual questions and implicates the Sixth Amendment. 
Shepard acknowledged Apprendi’s limitation on ACCA fact-finding, distinguishing judicial fact-
finding of a prior conviction for generic burglary “made on the authority of Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)” from fact-finding of a prior conviction for a non-generic burglary.  
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25.  A court determining whether a non-generic crime of burglary qualifies as 
ACCA burglary will need to resort to the jury instructions or other charging documents.  Id.  This fact-
finding 
is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and 
too much like the findings subject to Jones [v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)] 
and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve 
the dispute.  The rule of reading statutes to avoid serious risks of unconstitutionality, 
therefore counsels us to limit the scope of judicial factfinding on the disputed 
generic character of a prior plea, just as Taylor constrained judicial findings about 
the generic implication of a jury’s verdict. 
Id. at 25–26 (internal citation omitted).  The Court has acknowledged and limited the danger of judicial 
fact-finding that violates the Sixth Amendment.  In light of Apprendi and its progeny, the Court could 
not forsake the categorical approach in favor of judicial fact-finding regarding the actual conduct 
underlying a prior conviction. 
50 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007). 
51 Id. at 211–12. 
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physical injury.”  In this case, we can ask whether the risk 
posed by attempted burglary is comparable to that posed by 
its closest analog among the enumerated offenses—here, 
completed burglary.52   
Later, however, the Court stated that crimes falling under the residual 
clause must pose a risk comparable, but not necessarily equal, to the risk 
posed by the enumerated crimes.53  The Court then appeared to open the 
floodgates to all crimes that pose a serious risk, and not just those similar 
to the enumerated crimes: “As long as an offense is of a type that, by its 
nature, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, it satisfies the 
requirements of [the] residual provision.”54  As Justice Scalia argued in his 
dissent, this “almost entirely ad hoc” approach is hardly a model of clear 
guidance.55 
Second, James muddled the categorical approach, despite its firm 
restatement of the Taylor/Shepard language early in the opinion, by 
instructing courts for the first time to look beyond the elements of the 
statutory offense and consider the “ordinary” commission of the offense.  
“We do not view [the categorical] approach as requiring that every 
conceivable factual offense covered by a statute must necessarily present a 
serious potential risk of injury before the offense can be deemed a violent 
felony.”56  In other words, the statutory elements control, not the facts of 
the crime.  Someone could peacefully commit a crime, the elements of 
which require a serious potential risk of injury, simply by avoiding the 
injury.  For example, reckless driving, or even arson, presents a serious 
potential risk of injury to others, but one can commit it without actually 
injuring anyone.  A hypothetically peaceful commission of the crime 
should not exclude it from the residual clause.  Nonetheless, the Court 
restated this framework in a troubling fashion: “[T]he proper inquiry is 
whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the 
ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.”57  
This instruction presents two problems.  First, a sentencing court has 
few tools to determine reliably the “ordinary” commission of a crime.  
Without better guidance, courts have tried several approaches, including 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. at 203. 
53 Id. at 209 (arguing that crimes falling under the residual clause need not present “as much risk 
as the least dangerous enumerated offense” and “[w]hile it may be reasonable to infer that the risks 
presented by the enumerated offenses involve a risk of this magnitude, it does not follow that an 
offense that presents a lesser risk necessarily fails to qualify”). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That gets this case off our docket, sure enough.  But it utterly 
fails to do what this Court is supposed to do: provide guidance concrete enough to ensure that the 
ACCA residual provision will be applied with an acceptable degree of consistency . . . .”).  Justices 
Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
56 Id. at 208 (majority opinion). 
57 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the use of statistics, applying their “intuitive belief”58 to hypothesize how 
the crime is usually committed, and imagining how the crime could be 
committed in the exceptional case.59  Second, the emphasis on the 
“ordinary case” threatens to usurp the supposed primacy of the statutory 
elements.  Of course, these fears could be overblown.  One Seventh Circuit 
panel has construed James’s “ordinary case” language consistently with 
the categorical approach.60  Nonetheless, as another Seventh Circuit panel 
demonstrated,61 James provided the temptation for lower courts to consider 
more than the mere fact of conviction, the elements of the crime, and the 
charging documents. 
B.  Begay v. United States 
Begay v. United States was the Court’s next opportunity to refine its 
approach to the residual clause.  While Begay provided more guidance than 
James did, the opinion raised more questions than it answered.  The Begay 
Court considered whether three New Mexico convictions for driving under 
the influence were violent felonies under the ACCA.62   Returning to a 
limited construction of the residual clause, the Court held that the 
enumerated crimes limit “the crimes that clause (ii) covers to crimes that 
are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the 
examples themselves.”63  This language moves away from James’s 
potentially broad construction of the residual clause, but it still requires 
lower courts to wander through comparisons between the enumerated 
crimes and countless state crimes.   
Most significantly, Begay held that driving under the influence is not a 
violent felony.64 The Court reached this conclusion through its explication 
of the “similar[] in kind” requirement: the enumerated crimes in clause (ii) 
of the ACCA “all typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ 
conduct.”65  DUI statutes, on the other hand, “typically do not insist on 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct; rather, they are, or are most 
                                                                                                                          
58 Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009). 
59 See infra Part V.D.2. 
60 United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2009) (“As we understand it, this means 
that a crime must be categorized as one of violence even if, through some freak chance, the conduct did 
not turn out to be violent in an unusual case.”). 
61 See infra text accompanying notes 202–10 (discussing United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582 
(7th Cir. 2010)). 
62 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139–40 (2008).  In New Mexico, a DUI becomes a 
felony (punishable by imprisonment for more than one year) after the third offense.  Begay had a dozen 
DUI convictions.  Id. at 140.  
63 Id. at 143. 
64 Id. at 148 (“[A] prior record of DUI, a strict liability crime, differs from a prior record of 
violent and aggressive crimes committed intentionally such as arson, burglary, extortion, or crimes 
involving the use of explosives.  The latter are associated with a likelihood of future violent, 
aggressive, and purposeful ‘armed career criminal’ behavior in a way that the former are not.”).  
65 Id. at 144–45.  
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nearly comparable to, crimes that impose strict liability . . . .”66  Begay’s 
implicit requirement that crimes falling under the residual clause must 
typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct became, for 
lower courts, its key holding.67  The Begay Court anchored this new 
requirement in its understanding of the underlying purpose of the ACCA: 
the prevention of future armed crimes.  “As suggested by its title, the 
Armed Career Criminal Act focuses upon the special danger created when 
a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—
possesses a gun.”68  Purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, the Court 
said, “is such that it makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a 
gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.  Crimes committed in 
such a purposeful, violent, and aggressive manner are ‘potentially more 
dangerous when firearms are involved.’”69  In holding that a DUI did not 
qualify as a violent crime, the Court noted that a prior conviction of DUI is 
not “associated with a likelihood of future violent, aggressive, and 
purposeful ‘armed career criminal’ behavior.”70  Begay’s two different 
considerations, “purposeful, violent, and aggressive,” and the ACCA’s 
concern with a violent felon possessing a firearm, have led lower courts to 
results at odds with the categorical approach, as this Article later 
demonstrates.71 
C.  Chambers Continues “Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive” 
The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion regarding the residual clause 
of the ACCA, Chambers v. United States,72 further confused matters.  
Chambers applied Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to an 
Illinois conviction for failure to report to a penal institution.73  The Court 
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s holding that failure to report poses a “serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another” thereby falling under the 
residual clause.74  The Court’s application of Begay’s chief test was 
unremarkable: “Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of 
inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct’ 
potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, 
                                                                                                                          
66 Id. at 145. 
67 See id. at 144–45 (“The listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and 
‘aggressive’ conduct.”). 
68 Id. at 146. 
69 Id. at 144–45 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (2006)).  
70 Id. at 148. 
71 See infra Part IV for a discussion of Begay’s inherent problems. 
72 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) (reversing United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2007)).  
Although the Supreme Court issued another ACCA decision in 2010, Johnson v. United States 
analyzed a prior conviction under clause (i) of the ACCA and did not discuss the residual clause, 
Begay, or Chambers.  Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2010). 
73 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (West. Supp. 2008). 
74 Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691. 
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commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain 
forms of extortion.”75  The “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” standard 
seems to exclude failure to report on its face: the elements of the crime 
include a mens rea of “knowingly,” which may equate to “purposeful,” but 
they do not suggest violence or aggression.76 
But Chambers continued its analysis beyond the simple application of 
the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” standard to the elements of failure 
to report.  The Seventh Circuit had reluctantly followed circuit precedent 
and based its holding on the “conjecture as to the possible danger”77 posed 
by criminals who fail to report.78  Rather than adhering to a strict 
categorical approach that asks only whether the elements of the crime 
necessarily involve violent behavior, the Seventh Circuit sought to 
determine whether failure to report is statistically likely to be committed in 
a violent manner.  Begay’s concern with the danger posed by the armed 
offender encouraged the Seventh Circuit’s inquiry and the Supreme Court 
in Chambers reaffirmed that concern: “The question is whether such an 
offender is significantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to 
resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a ‘serious potential risk of 
physical injury.’”79  The Supreme Court then cited a Sentencing 
Commission report that surveyed two years of federal sentences involving 
failure to report and found that none involved violence.80  The Court used 
the study to confirm “the intuitive belief that failure to report does not 
involve a serious potential risk of physical injury.”81  This statistical 
inquiry drew upon Begay’s understanding of the ACCA’s animating 
purpose.  While Begay had emphasized the “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive” test, Chambers seemed to emphasize a statistical inquiry into 
                                                                                                                          
75 Id. at 692. 
76 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (“A person convicted of a felony . . . who knowingly fails to 
report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails to 
return from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to abide by the terms of 
home confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.”); Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691–92 (applying the 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct test to the crime of failing to report to a penal institution). 
77 United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007). 
78 The Seventh Circuit’s Chambers panel, led by Judge Posner, adhered to circuit precedent and 
“overwhelming support in the decisions of the other circuits.”  Chambers, 473 F.3d at 726.  But it did 
not do so without protest:  
We shall adhere to the precedents for now.  But it is an embarrassment to the law 
when judges base decisions of consequence on conjectures, in this case a conjecture 
as to the possible danger of physical injury posed by criminals who fail to show up 
to begin serving their sentences or fail to return from furloughs or to halfway 
houses.  
Id.  
79 Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
80 The Seventh Circuit in Chambers had urged the U.S. Sentencing Commission to study the 
frequency of violence in escapes and failures to report.  Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727.  By the time the 
Supreme Court decided Chambers, the Sentencing Commission had obliged.  See infra notes 240–45 
and accompanying text.  
81 Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692. 
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whether the predicate felony increased the likelihood that the offender 
would engage in armed felonies in the future.  After Chambers, it is 
unclear which test has primacy. 
Chambers mentioned the categorical approach only once, in terms of 
assessing the correct part of the disjunctive failure to report statute.  That 
nod toward the categorical approach is a sliver of what had been rote 
doctrine only four years ago—that sentencing courts must stick to the fact 
of the conviction and charging documents and not consider the facts 
underlying the offense.  Not merely a complex formula promulgated by the 
Supreme Court, the categorical approach protects offenders’ Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right by ensuring that their punishment is based on 
crimes that they actually committed.  After Begay and Chambers, circuit 
courts may justifiably wonder if the categorical approach is dead, and 
which part of Supreme Court precedent to use in applying the residual 
clause of the ACCA.  As Justice Alito observed, “each new application of 
the residual clause seems to lead us further and further away from the 
statutory text.”82 
IV.  THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN BEGAY  
Begay—and later, Chambers—provided lower courts with two 
inquiries to determine whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony under 
the ACCA’s residual clause.  First, the crime must be similar in kind, as 
well as degree of risk posed, to the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, 
extortion, and use of explosives.83  “Similar in kind” means, according to 
Begay, that the crime must involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” 
conduct.84  Second, Begay and Chambers suggest that the crime must be of 
the kind that makes the offender more likely to use a gun in future crimes 
to harm a victim.85  This Article refers to this second consideration as the 
“likely shooter” requirement.  This section examines the difficulties with 
understanding “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” as well as the 
requirement that the violent felony evince an increased likelihood that the 
offender might deliberately use a gun to harm a victim. 
A.  The Nebulous “Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive” Test 
Requiring that residual clause crimes be “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive” presents two problems.  The first is Begay’s failure to define 
                                                                                                                          
82 Id. at 695 (Alito, J., concurring). 
83 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
84 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
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“purposeful,” “violent,” or “aggressive.”86  This omission  
creates problems of classification.  It may be easy to tell 
when a person’s conduct was violent and aggressive, but 
whether a crime of conviction entails such conduct can be 
tricky, because it is necessary to think through the many 
varieties of behavior within a law’s domain.  States did not 
write their statutes with Begay in mind.87   
While “violent” and “purposeful” are terms used with some frequency 
in state and federal statutes, “aggressive” has no commonly used legal 
definition.88  Aside from aggressive driving statutes, which delineate very 
specific driving actions that make driving legally “aggressive,”89 no other 
state statutes appear to define “aggressive.”  Nonetheless, some statutes 
still employ “aggressive” without defining it.90  Given the varying 
definitions of “aggressive,” one could conclude, as the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits have, that it is synonymous with “violent.”91  But why would the 
Supreme Court add a gratuitous requirement to its Begay holding?  Lower 
courts may assume that the Court carefully chooses its words.  If 
“aggressive” has any meaning different from “violent,” however, it is 
unclear what additional elements a crime must require in order to be a 
violent felony.   
The word “purposeful” is used in some state statutes but often without 
                                                                                                                          
86 United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Perhaps because it is common sense 
that a DUI is not violent or aggressive in an ordinary sense, the Supreme Court did not define those 
terms or explain in other than conclusory terms why a DUI was not violent or aggressive.”). 
87 United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).   
88 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 160 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The concept of 
‘aggressive’ crimes is vague . . . .”). 
89 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 9-21-8-55(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (defining “aggressive driving” as 
committing at least three specific acts, including “[f]ollowing a vehicle too closely,” “[u]nsafe 
operation of a vehicle,” and “[u]nsafe stopping or slowing,” among others).  
90 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2301 (LexisNexis 2001) (defining “aggressive manner” for the 
purposes of a panhandling statute as certain specific actions); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-5(a) (2010) 
(discussing a finding of the General Assembly that “minors who play video games are more likely  
to . . . [e]xhibit violent, asocial, or aggressive behavior”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e) (2009) 
(including the question of “whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner” among factors to consider when determining whether a juvenile should 
be tried as an adult); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.18 (2004) (providing that law enforcement may 
seize a dog which kills or harms a human “when unprovoked, in an aggressive manner”); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-02(5) (2009) (defining “sexual contact” as certain forms of contact “for the 
purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires”). 
91 United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that “the ‘violent and 
aggressive’ limitation requires only that a residual-clause predicate crime be characterized by 
aggressive conduct with a similar potential for violence and therefore injury as the enumerated 
offenses”); United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We consider it unlikely 
that any conduct properly characterized as ‘violent’ could not also be characterized as ‘aggressive.’”).  
But see Herrick, 545 F.3d at 59 (“Although [vehicular homicide] is no doubt violent, as a typical 
vehicular homicide involves the death of a victim resulting from a forceful collision, it is not 
necessarily aggressive, a term that dovetails with purposeful because it involves a degree of intent.”).  
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definition.92  The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) lists “purposely” as one of 
four types of culpability, along with “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and 
“negligently.”93  According to the MPC:  
A person acts purposely with respect to a material 
element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the 
nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious 
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a 
result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such 
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.94   
While a minority of states have criminal statutes requiring 
“purposeful” conduct, all fifty states and the District of Columbia use a 
form of “intentional” as a criminal mens rea.95  It is unclear how the terms 
                                                                                                                          
92 Eleven states and the District of Columbia appear to use “purposely” or a derivative as criminal 
mens rea.  This figure is approximate given the search methodology: a search of Westlaw’s state 
statutes database (STAT-ALL) for “ti(crim!) & (purposeful purposely “with the purpose” “with 
purpose”).”  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-103(b)(1), (b)(1)(2) (2006) (“purposely”), id. § 5-37-
208(b)(1)  (“with the purpose to”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2101 (2001) (“purposely”); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 506.120(1) (West 2009) (“with the purpose to”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.111c(c) (2006) 
(“with the purpose of”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225.1(3) (2010) (“purposely”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
23-5-161 (2009) (“purposely”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(IV) (2007) (“purposely”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:5-1(a)(1), (a)(3) (2005) (“purposely”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-221.1 (2009) (“with the 
purpose of”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.07(A)(2), (A)(5) (West 2010) (“[w]ith purpose to”); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5508(a)(3) (2006) (“purposely”). 
93 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a).   
94 Id. 
95 All fifty states and the District of Columbia appear to use “intentionally” or a derivative as 
criminal mens rea.  See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(1) (2005) (“intentionally”); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.320 
(2008) (“with intent to”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(10)(a) (2006) (“intentionally”); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 27-14-2207(a) (2008) (“with intent”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 141(a), (b) (2010) (“intentionally”); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (2000) (“with the intent to”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 
(2007) (“intentionally”); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 253 (2007) (“intentionally”); D.C. CODE § 7-
627(d) (2008) (“with the intent to”); FLA. STAT. § 934.43(1)(a)–(b) (2006) (“with intent to”); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-2-20(b)(2)–(3), (b)(4) (2003) (“intentionally”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500(1)(a)–(b), (2) 
(1993) (“intentionally”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7011(2) (2006) (“intentionally”); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. § 5/12-19(d)(1) (2002) (“intentionally”); IND. CODE § 35-42-2-2(b), (d) (2009) 
(“intentionally”); IOWA CODE § 716.1 (2003) (“intentionally”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3419(a)(1) 
(2009) (“with intent to”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.100(1) (West 2006) (“intentionally”); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:67.12(A) (2010) (“with the intent to”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 57(3)(A) 
(2006) (“with the intent”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 8-801(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (“with 
intent to”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 13D(a) (2008) (“with intent to”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
750.110a(2)–(3), (4)(a) (2003) (“with intent to”); MINN. STAT. § 609.855(1)–(2) (2009) 
(“intentionally”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-44-19(1) (2006) (“intentionally”); MO. REV. STAT. § 
565.225.1(2) (1999) (“with the intent to”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-103(1)–(3) (2008) (“with intent 
to”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-519(1)–(5) (2008) (“intentionally”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.800(1) (2009) 
(“with the intent to”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:23(I)–(II) (2002) (“with intent to”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:21-25(b)(1) (West 2005) (“with the intent to”); N.M. STAT. § 30-9-12(A) (2004) 
(“intentional”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.05 (2010) (“with intent to”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-34.8(b) 
(2002) (“intentionally”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01(1) (1997) (“intentionally”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2909.07(A)(6) (West 2010) (“with intent to”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 856.1 (2002) 
(“intentionally”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2) (2010) (“with intent to”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
907(a)–(b) (2010) (“with intent to”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-5 (2002) (“with intent to”); S.C. CODE 
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differ, if at all.  Perhaps there is no difference between the two—the words 
are arguably interchangeable, as some state legislatures and courts seem to 
assume.96  But if the Court meant to require specific intent, why did it not 
use the term “intentional”?  The choice is especially mystifying given that 
“intentional” is more commonly used in statutes and case law. This 
confusion complicates the application of Begay. 
The second problem is determining whether the “purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive” standard applies to the requisite elements of a crime or the 
typical commission of a crime.  The Begay Court first introduced the 
phrase by stating that the enumerated crimes “all typically involve 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”97  In this phrasing, the word 
“typically” modifies “involve,” which refers to the enumerated crimes.  
This suggests that courts are to determine whether residual clause crimes 
typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.  That 
language invites examination into the usual method of committing the 
crime.  Such an approach creates tension with the categorical approach, 
which considers only what the statutory elements require rather than the 
typical method of violating the statute.  The Court next used the phrase in a 
slightly different way: “[S]tatutes that forbid driving under the influence  
. . . typically do not insist on purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct.”98  In this formulation, “typically” modifies “insist,” which refers 
to the various state statutes.  This formulation suggests that crimes are only 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive if the state statute requires purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive conduct.  That second formulation more closely 
tracks the strict categorical approach set forth in Taylor and Shepard.99  An 
example better demonstrates the difference between these two approaches.  
Auto theft statutes typically do not insist on, or require, violent and 
                                                                                                                          
ANN. § 16-3-656 (2009) (“with intent to”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-4A-1 (2006) (“with the intent 
to”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-406(d)(1)(A)–(B), (e)(1) (2006) (“with the intent to”); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (West 2003) (“intentionally”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (West 2008) 
(“intentionally”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 12 (2009) (“with intent to”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308.2:3(I), (J), (M) (2009) (“intentionally”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020(1) (2009) (“with 
intent to”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-22-12 (2008) (“with intent to”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.012 
(2005) (“intentionally”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301(a)(ii) (2009) (“intentionally”). 
96 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(17) (2008) (“‘Purposely’ or an equivalent term such as 
‘purpose’, ‘with purpose’, ‘intentional’, ‘intentionally’, ‘intended’, or ‘with intent to’ means the same 
as ‘purposely’ as defined in § 5-2-202.”); id. § 5-2-202(1) (using “purposely” instead of “intentionally” 
for the most culpable kind of mens rea); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201(b) (2009) (“Intentional conduct is 
conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13C-508(F) (2004) 
(“‘[W]illfully’ means purposely or intentionally . . . .”); D.E. v. State, 904 So. 2d 558, 561 (Fla. App. 
2005) (“‘Willful’ means ‘intentional, knowing, and purposeful ’ . . . .”); In re Jerry R., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
155, 160 (Cal. App. 4th. 1994) (“The Legislature’s use of the term ‘willfully’ means that the prohibited 
conduct must be performed purposefully or intentionally.”). 
97 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
marks omitted). 
98 Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
99 For a discussion of the categorical approach in Taylor and Shepard, see supra text 
accompanying notes 41–49. 
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aggressive conduct.  Rather, a few states require only: (1) knowingly or 
intentionally, (2) exerting, (3) unauthorized control, (4) over another 
person’s vehicle, (5) with intent to deprive.100  Therefore, under the second 
formulation, these crimes are not violent felonies.  However, under the first 
“typically” formulation, one might plausibly argue that auto theft in fact 
often involves violent and aggressive conduct.  Judge Steven Colloton of 
the Eighth Circuit has argued that what begins as auto theft tends to turn 
into a dangerous high-speed chase when the police are called and therefore 
is “typically” violent and aggressive.101   
Even assuming, however, that Begay’s second formulation is the 
correct one, that formulation may still sit uneasily with the categorical 
approach.  If state statutes must “typically insist” on purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive conduct, perhaps only a plurality or majority of state 
statutes defining a particular crime must require those elements.  Rather 
than looking to see whether the specific state statute at issue requires 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, lower courts could survey all 
state statutes defining the crime and craft a generic definition of the crime, 
as the Taylor Court did.  The categorical approach, then, would apply to 
the typical, generic formulation of the crime.  For example, one may be 
convicted under a state auto theft statute which requires violent and 
aggressive conduct as elements in order to convict.  But because the vast 
majority of state auto theft statutes do not typically require violent and 
aggressive behavior, such a crime may not qualify as “purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive” under Begay’s rough formulation.  The imprecision of 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” sends lower courts mixed signals, at 
best, leading them to varying results.  
B.  The Rootless “Likely Shooter” 
Even once courts decide which formulation of “purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive” to adopt, they are not out of the woods yet.  The ACCA 
imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on felons convicted 
of possessing a gun who have three prior convictions for violent felonies, 
serious drug offenses, or both.  Begay and Chambers suggested, for the 
first time, that a prior crime qualifies as a violent felony only if it is the 
type of crime that makes it more likely that the criminal will use or possess 
a weapon in future crimes.102  Specifically, the Court explained that it was 
                                                                                                                          
100 E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.46.360(a) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1802(A), (G) (2010); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2.5(b) (2009). 
101 United States v. Williams, 546 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc).  
102 See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009) (questioning “whether . . . such an 
offender is significantly more likely than others to attack or resist an apprehender, thereby producing a 
serious risk of physical injury”); Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.  
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especially concerned with violent felonies that “show an increased 
likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately 
point the gun and pull the trigger.”103  To the Court, the title of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act means that the ACCA focuses upon “the special 
danger created when a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or 
drug trafficker—possesses a gun.”104  As support, the Court cited Judge 
McConnell’s dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s Begay decision,105 in which 
he wrote, “the legislative history, both originally and in the amendments 
relevant to this case, makes clear that the title—the ‘Armed Career 
Criminal Act’—was not merely decorative.”106 
1.  The Judicial and Legislative History of the “Likely Shooter” 
Contrary to the Begay Court’s claims, the “likely shooter” inquiry is a 
judicial creation without any root in the ACCA or its legislative history.  
The ACCA’s title says nothing about whether courts should categorize a 
particular crime as a violent felony.  Although a statute’s title is a valid 
source for statutory interpretation,107 the title of the ACCA is itself 
ambiguous as to when the criminal is armed.  Under the most natural 
reading, the title implies that the Act is concerned with career criminals, 
who are currently armed by virtue of the instant felon-in-possession 
conviction.  Neither the Act’s title nor its text imply that the three previous 
violent felonies should be of the type that make the instant felon-in-
possession charge—or any other weapon-toting crime—more likely.  A 
close examination of the legislative history reveals no suggestion that 
Congress was primarily concerned with prior violent felonies that create an 
increased risk of future armed crime.108  While the three prior felonies may 
                                                                                                                          
103 Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.  
104 Id. at 152; see also id. at 147 (stating that certain crimes with mens rea of negligence or 
recklessness are “far removed . . . from the deliberate kind of behavior associated with the violent 
criminal use of firearms”). 
105 Id. at 145 (citing United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 981 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, 
J., dissenting)).  
106 Begay, 470 F.3d at 981 n.3 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1159 (1984), 
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710). 
107 See, e.g., Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (considering the title of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924 to determine whether “machinegun” was an element of a new crime or a statutory enhancement).  
But see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001) (“[A] title alone is not controlling.”); Pa. Dep’t of 
Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“‘[T]he title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning 
of the text. For interpretive purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous 
word or phrase.’” (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 
(1947))).  
108 The ACCA’s legislative history suggests that it was meant to be a pure three-strikes recidivist 
statute for felons convicted of possession of a firearm.  The legislative history reveals only one clear 
purpose for the “armed” aspect of the ACCA: the trigger for federal authority.  Without the connection 
to a conviction for felon in possession, federal courts could not constitutionally punish state crimes 
because “purely local activities [are] beyond the reach of federal power.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1, 9 (2005) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–13 (2000)); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (stating that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no 
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increase the likelihood that the offender will commit yet another crime, 
only the instant gun-possession conviction, not the three prior felonies, 
makes it likely that the offender will use a gun in a future crime.   
The Begay Court seemed to acknowledge its extra-textual, policy-
driven approach: “Were we to read the statute without this distinction, its 
15-year mandatory minimum sentence would apply to a host of crimes 
which, though dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one 
normally labels ‘armed career criminals.’”109  In other words, the “likely 
shooter” requirement is not drawn from the text of the statute, but was 
created by the Court to avoid what it regards as undesirable outcomes, such 
as including DUIs as violent felonies.  Unfortunately, this attempt to 
determine the ACCA’s policy rationale has only further complicated 
interpretation of the residual clause.  
2.  The “Likely Shooter” Conflicts with the Categorical Approach 
Not only is the “likely shooter” requirement absent from the title, text, 
and legislative history of the ACCA, but it also fits poorly with the 
categorical approach.  This examination, whether the prior felony entails 
conduct that makes it more likely that the criminal will deliberately use a 
gun in future crimes, necessarily casts a wider net than the categorical 
approach.  If a sentencing court were limited to examining the elements of 
the previous crime, the likelihood of future armed crime would be an 
irrelevant question.  The court could consider whether the elements of the 
predicate crime require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct without 
engaging in the “likely shooter” inquiry.  Further, the “likely shooter” 
inquiry unmoors the court from both the text of the ACCA and the 
                                                                                                                          
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of 
interstate commerce” and is therefore beyond the reach of federal power).   
Senator Specter’s testimony in favor of the 1986 House bill is telling on this point: “The armed 
career criminal bill for the first time brings the Federal Government into the fight against street crime 
by making it a Federal offense for career criminals to possess a firearm.” Armed Career Criminal 
Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 43 (1986) (statement of Sen. Specter).  The criminal must first commit the 
three predicate violent felonies, qualifying as a career criminal.  The subsequent possession of the 
firearm then “brings the Federal Government into the fight.”  Id.  Neither the 1984 ACCA nor the 1986 
ACCA were concerned with the criminal who possessed the firearm during the predicate crime.  The 
firearm component of the law is present only because it opens the door to federal authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person—who has been 
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; . . . to 
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce.”); see also Levine, supra note 1, at 547 (2009) (“[T]he desire to 
incapacitate career criminals seems to have been the principal motivation for the ACCA.  In fact, it 
appears that the only reason that the minimum fifteen-year sentence is mandated for illegally 
possessing firearms is that imposing the sentence on all career criminals regardless of whether they 
were convicted of violating a federal law (such as by illegally possessing a gun) was not a politically 
feasible option due to the aforementioned federalism concerns.”). 
109 Begay, 553 U.S. at 146. 
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“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test for points unknown.  
Exacerbating this problem is the lack of a standard to measure the 
likelihood—how likely is likely enough?  As this Article discusses below, 
lower courts struggle with those very questions.   
By holding that a DUI does not constitute a violent felony under the 
ACCA, the Supreme Court in Begay reached an arguably just result.  But 
Begay’s ad hoc approach spells trouble for any court trying to understand 
its reasoning, and even more trouble for a court trying to follow Begay 
while remaining faithful to the Supreme Court’s categorical approach and 
the text of the ACCA itself.   
V.  ISSUES IN BEGAY IMPLEMENTATION 
If Begay is problematic on its face, in practice it is downright ugly.  
This section discusses four main problems with lower courts’ 
implementation of Begay.  First, by requiring that violent felonies be 
“purposeful” as well as violent and aggressive, Begay appeared to require 
specific intent for residual clause crimes.  Therefore, crimes with a mens 
rea of negligence or recklessness cannot qualify as violent felonies even if 
those crimes present a serious potential risk of bodily injury.  After Begay, 
lower courts have obligingly excluded reckless and negligent crimes from 
the residual clause.  This has led to seemingly absurd results such as a 
holding that negligent vehicular homicide is not a “violent felony.”110  
Second, Begay has caused a division between the formerly compatible 
ACCA and career offender guideline.  Because the statutory definitions of 
“violent felony” in the ACCA and “crime of violence” in the career 
offender guideline are almost identical, federal courts interchangeably 
apply the jurisprudence interpreting the two provisions.111  Begay has 
called this compatibility into serious doubt.  Third, the combination of the 
categorical approach and Begay’s requirement that a prior crime be 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” excludes sex crimes against children 
that pose a serious potential risk of bodily injury.  Fourth, lower courts 
have accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to deviate from the 
categorical approach and search for the “ordinary case” and the “likely 
shooter” using little more than their imaginations, intuitions, and varied use 
of statistics.112  
A.  Specific Intent Is Underinclusive 
Begay’s requirement that predicate violent felonies be “purposeful” has 
led circuit courts to exclude crimes that appear to fall squarely within the 
                                                                                                                          
110 United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2008).  
111 See infra note 141. 
112 See supra Part IV.B. 
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residual clause.  Recall that the residual clause of the ACCA includes any 
prior felonies involving “a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”113  Begay held that a DUI is not a violent felony because, among 
other reasons, DUI statutes “are most nearly comparable to[] crimes that 
impose strict liability”114 and “the conduct for which the drunk driver is 
convicted need not be purposeful or deliberate.”115  Clearly, Begay means 
that strict liability crimes like DUI cannot qualify as violent felonies under 
the residual clause.   
But what about crimes requiring a mens rea of recklessness or 
negligence?  By holding that prior crimes must be “purposeful” to fall 
under the residual clause, the Court strongly suggested that negligent or 
reckless criminal offenses can never qualify.  “Purposeful” conduct 
typically equates to intentional conduct.116  As examples of crimes that “are 
not typically committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career 
criminals’” and therefore should not qualify as violent felonies, Begay 
offered several state and federal crimes with a mens rea of negligence or 
recklessness.117  The selected crimes are a curious list of low-hanging fruit.  
Instead of listing crimes of recklessness or negligence that might pose 
tougher questions—that is, crimes better characterized as violent felonies 
like involuntary manslaughter or reckless endangerment—the Court chose 
environmental or consumer crimes that indirectly pose a risk of bodily 
injury.  These crimes poorly demonstrate the effects of the new, post-
Begay ACCA; they would not constitute violent felonies even under the 
plain language of the ACCA because they do not pose the same or even 
comparable risk of potential injury as the enumerated crimes.  Its poor 
choice of illustrative crimes aside, the Court strongly implied that crimes 
of negligence or recklessness cannot be violent felonies. 
Many courts of appeals have expressly said what Begay only implied: 
violent felonies under the residual clause must require specific intent.  The 
Seventh Circuit has stated that “crimes with a mens rea of negligence or 
recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the 
ACCA.”118  Another circuit court’s survey of post-Begay cases from other 
                                                                                                                          
113 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) (2006).  
114 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008). 
115 Id. 
116 See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text 
117 Begay, 553 U.S. at 146–47 (“See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2007) 
(reckless polluters); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006) (individuals who negligently introduce pollutants 
into the sewer system); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) (individuals who recklessly tamper with consumer 
products); § 1115 (seamen whose inattention to duty causes serious accidents).”). 
118 United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Lee, 612 
F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although it 
is hardly debatable that the elements of felony reckless endangerment in Tennessee present a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another, . . . the offense does not clearly involve the type of 
‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ conduct as burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives . . . . 
Rather, on its face the statute criminalizes only reckless conduct.” (internal citations omitted) (internal 
 
 2010] VIOLENT CRIMES AND KNOWN ASSOCIATES 233 
circuits concluded, “These decisions make clear that when a statute does 
not require deliberate or purposeful conduct, a conviction under such a 
statute will not be considered a violent felony under the [residual clause of 
the] ACCA . . . .”119   
This new requirement excludes crimes of negligence or recklessness 
that involve “a serious potential risk of bodily injury.”120  Since Begay, 
appellate courts have overturned their own precedents holding that certain 
dangerous crimes—involuntary manslaughter,121 negligent vehicular 
homicide,122 and reckless endangerment123—are violent felonies under the 
ACCA or crimes of violence under the career offender guideline.124   
Judges of the Seventh Circuit recently clashed over whether 
involuntary manslaughter should be classified as a crime of violence.125  In 
United States v. Woods, Woods pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter for 
dropping and shaking his five-week-old infant son, causing his death.126  
The Illinois involuntary manslaughter statute criminalizes reckless acts that 
result in an unintentional killing without lawful justification.127  
Acknowledging that involuntary manslaughter requires only a mens rea of 
recklessness, the Government argued that the intent to commit the act, 
even while only “reckless as to the consequences of that act,” was 
sufficient to bring a crime of recklessness under the residual clause after 
                                                                                                                          
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Begay places 
a strong emphasis on intentional—purposeful—conduct as a prerequisite for a crime to be considered 
similar in kind to the listed crimes.”). 
119 United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 241–42 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing United States v. 
Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2008)); Gray, 535 F.3d at 131–32; United States v. Archer, 531 
F.3d 1347, 1348–52 (11th Cir. 2008)).  Roseboro incorrectly cites Herrick for this proposition.  Herrick 
held that vehicular homicide’s requisite intent fell below “other crimes that the Begay majority listed as 
crimes that do not fall under the residual clause.”  Herrick, 545 F.3d at 59.  More importantly, Herrick 
expressly avoided deciding “whether crimes with a recklessness mens rea could ever come within the 
residual clause.” Id. at 60. 
120 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) (2006).  
121 United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 411–12 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that an Illinois 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not a crime of violence). 
122 Herrick, 545 F.3d at 59. 
123 United States v. Bishop, No. 08-1950, 2009 WL 2503646, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 17, 2009) 
(stating that a Wisconsin conviction for second-degree reckless endangerment is not a crime of 
violence); Baker, 559 F.3d at 453; Gray, 535 F.3d at 132. 
124 Some of these decisions actually decided whether the crime was a “crime of violence” under 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2009).  The definition of “crime of violence” in the 
“career offender” guideline is nearly identical to the ACCA, so circuits use ACCA precedent for 
section 4B1.2 and vice-versa.  For a list of circuit decisions treating the two provisions interchangeably, 
see infra note 141. 
125 Woods, 576 F.3d at 401, 407.  The Seventh Circuit treats “violent felony” under the ACCA 
“interchangeably” with “crime of violence” under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2.  
Woods, 576 F.3d at 404. 
126 Woods, 576 F.3d at 401–02. 
127 Id. at 410 (“A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification 
commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are 
such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them 
recklessly.” (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3(a)).  
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Begay.128  That creatively expansive take on Begay’s “purposeful” 
requirement would make all crimes of recklessness crimes of violence 
because “[e]very crime of recklessness necessarily requires a purposeful, 
volitional act that sets in motion the later outcome.”129  For example, under 
this reasoning, shooting into a crowded room would be purposeful because 
one intends to pull the trigger, even though the shooter was only reckless 
as to the consequences of the act.  Rejecting that argument as inconsistent 
with Begay, the court held that crimes of recklessness cannot fall within 
the scope of the residual clause and that an Illinois conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter is not a crime of violence.130  
Woods’s holding met strong resistance from other Seventh Circuit 
judges.  Because the unanimous Woods panel disagreed with another 
panel’s application of the categorical approach, the Seventh Circuit 
resolved the dispute by circulating the opinions to the entire court instead 
of an en banc hearing.131  The majority of the Seventh Circuit agreed with 
the Woods panel, but Judge Easterbrook dissented, joined by Judges Posner 
and Tinder.132  The dissenters argued that all homicides are instinctively 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive: “How can homicide not be an 
intentional, violent, and aggressive act?”133  The Illinois involuntary 
manslaughter law’s requirement of an intentional act is sufficiently 
purposeful, the dissenters argued, to make it a crime of violence under 
Begay.  “The possibility that Woods did not intend to drop the child need 
not detain us; the state statute requires some knowing conduct, a standard 
satisfied by the [intentional] shaking if not the dropping.”134  The criminal 
recklessness involved in the Illinois involuntary manslaughter statute “is a 
form of intent,” Judge Easterbrook continued, “and I think it likely that the 
Justices will deem it sufficient for recidivism enhancements too.”135  After 
chipping away at the long-standing distinction between intentional and 
reckless, Judge Easterbrook revealed his ultimate purpose—to void 
Begay’s “purposeful” requirement.  “I grant that recklessness is not 
universally equivalent to intent; statutory context matters.  But in the main 
a violent or aggressive crime that produces injury or death should meet the 
Begay standard, even if the actor recklessly ignored the risks to others.”136  
                                                                                                                          
128 Id. at 410. 
129 Id. at 411. 
130 Id. at 412–13. 
131 Id. at 407. 
132 Id. at 413 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  
133 Id. at 414. 
134 Id. at 416. 
135 Id.  The Second Circuit has held that one affirmative act fulfills Begay’s “purposeful” 
requirement.  Although sexual assault of a child is a strict liability crime under Vermont law, it 
“involves deliberate and affirmative conduct—namely, an intentional sexual act with a person who is, 
in fact, under the age of consent—sufficient to satisfy Begay’s observation that violent felonies . . . 
typically involve ‘purposeful’ conduct.”  United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2009).  
136 Woods, 576 F.3d at 417 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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By this formulation, a crime need not be purposeful to be a crime of 
violence, and it can be either violent or aggressive, so long as it is 
physically harmful.  Judge Easterbrook’s test is compatible with the text of 
the residual clause—which includes all crimes that pose a serious potential 
risk of physical injury—but he failed to reconcile it with the language of 
Begay.   
Among the circuits that have considered whether the post-Begay 
residual clause requires intentional conduct, only the First Circuit has 
avoided holding that it requires intentional conduct.137  Instead of 
categorically excluding all crimes of recklessness and negligence, the First 
Circuit compared the crime to the other crimes discussed in Begay to 
determine whether negligent vehicular homicide constitutes a crime of 
violence.  Negligent vehicular homicide requires more culpability than 
DUI, the court reasoned, but less culpability than the negligent and 
reckless environmental crimes that Begay listed as lacking the requisite 
intent for a violent felony.138  Thus, the court concluded that negligent 
vehicular homicide is not a crime of violence.   
A wild imagination is not necessary to hypothesize other, very 
dangerous crimes that directly threaten others’ lives and require only 
negligence or recklessness.  Felony murder is one example.139  Even 
though Begay did not actually hold that only specific intent crimes may 
constitute violent felonies, its dicta has effected that outcome in the lower 
courts. 
B.  Conflict with the Career Offender Sentencing Guideline 
Begay’s statement that only “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” 
crimes qualify as violent felonies technically applies only to the ACCA.  
However, that holding creates tension with the commentary interpreting a 
“crime of violence” under the career offender sentencing guideline.   
Textually, the two provisions are nearly identical.  The only substantial 
difference between their texts is that the “crime of violence” definition in 
the guideline includes “burglary of a dwelling” as an enumerated crime, 
whereas the “violent felony” definition of the ACCA includes mere 
“burglary.”140  The career offender guideline, like the ACCA, has a 
                                                                                                                          
137 United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (avoiding the decision of “whether 
crimes with a recklessness mens rea could ever come within the residual clause”). 
138 Id. at 59 (“Although vehicular homicide’s mens rea of criminal negligence under this statute 
surpasses that of the DUI at issue in Begay . . . it is below that of other crimes that the Begay majority 
listed as crimes that do not fall under the residual clause.”). 
139 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2) (2007) (“A person is guilty of murder in the first 
degree when . . . [w]hile engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing 
or attempting to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes the death of another person.”). 
140 Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2009), which states:  
The term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—(1) has as an 
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residual clause that includes any crime involving “conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  Because the two 
provisions are so similar, all circuits have treated the case law regarding 
“violent felony” and “crime of violence” as fungible both before141 and 
after142 Begay.   
Although the texts of the provisions are so similar, the commentary to 
the “crime of violence” definition adds a host of crimes to those 
enumerated in the guideline itself.  The guideline commentary lists murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, 
robbery, extortionate extension of credit, and unlawfully possessing certain 
prohibited firearms as crimes of violence, even though they are not 
                                                                                                                          
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use 
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. 
with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006), which states: 
[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 
141 United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a prior decision 
qualifying crime as a “crime of violence” foreclosed argument that crime was not a “violent felony”); 
United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the court will look to cases 
dealing with “crime of violence” and “violent felony” to interpret the other); United States v. Taylor, 
489 F.3d 1112, 1113 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting previous holdings that “crime of violence” cases “provide 
important guidance in determining what is a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA”), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Taylor v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 990 (2009); United States v. Spudich, 443 F.3d 
986, 987 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that the “same analysis” applies to “crime of violence” and “violent 
felony”); United States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1005 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the court “may 
consult cases construing [‘crime of violence’] when considering whether a crime is a ‘violent felony’ 
under the ACCA”); United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “violent 
felony” case law from another circuit is “persuasive authority” to determine whether a similar crime 
qualifies as a “crime of violence); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 330, 333 n.5 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(providing that “violent felony” reasoning “is relevant to determining the meaning of ‘crime of 
violence’”); United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 764 (10th Cir. 2000) (using “violent felony” case 
to find that similar crime constituted a “crime of violence”); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d 593, 
594–95 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that “it would be logically inconsistent” for a crime to qualify as a 
“crime of violence” and not as a “violent felony”); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(stating that “crime of violence” and “violent felony” “should be read consistently with each other”); 
United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1062 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that “violent felony” cases are 
“controlling” when interpreting “crime of violence”), overruled in part by In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 
1085 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that ACCA 
precedent is “highly germane authority” for interpreting “crime of violence”). 
142 United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084, 1087 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Harris, 586 
F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009); Toledo v. United States, 581 F.3d 678, 680 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060, 
1068 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Mohr, 554 F.3d 604, 609 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 738 (4th Cir. 
2009); In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 
58 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Billups, 536 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gray, 
535 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 2010] VIOLENT CRIMES AND KNOWN ASSOCIATES 237 
enumerated in the guideline.143  Most importantly, the commentary lists 
manslaughter as a crime of violence without specifying whether it is 
referring to voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.144  Nor does the 
commentary specify whether manslaughter qualifies as a crime of violence 
because it requires the use of force (under subsection (1) of the guideline) 
or because it falls under the residual clause of the guideline.  Given the 
rather broad reach of the ACCA’s residual clause, all the additional crimes 
in the guideline commentary could also plausibly fall under the text of the 
residual clause—that is, before Begay and its apparent holding that only 
“purposeful” crimes constitute violent felonies under the ACCA.   
By interpreting the ACCA to include only purposeful crimes, the 
Supreme Court in Begay introduced a potential rift between the ACCA and 
the career offender guideline.  After all, the guideline commentary clearly 
states that manslaughter is a crime of violence, even though manslaughter 
need not be purposeful.  Courts attempting to wrestle with this budding 
conflict have taken a variety of approaches. 
Courts assume that Begay applies with equal force to the career 
offender guideline in spite of the fact that Begay only dealt explicitly with 
the ACCA.145  These courts cite their own precedent stating that the two 
provisions should be interpreted identically and ignore or explain away the 
inclusion of manslaughter in the guideline commentary.  Circuits applying 
Begay to the career offender guideline exclude crimes of negligence or 
recklessness that previously qualified as crimes of violence.  The 
Wisconsin crime of negligent vehicular homicide “fits neatly” as a crime 
of violence within the residual clause because it presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.146  It fit so neatly that the First Circuit 
unequivocally declared: “There is no possible formulation of the 
Wisconsin motor vehicle homicide statute that would criminalize conduct 
that would not constitute a [crime of violence] under the formal categorical 
approach to [the] Guidelines.”147  Nonetheless, because the crime does not 
fulfill Begay’s purposeful requirement, the court concluded that it cannot 
qualify as a crime of violence.148  The same goes for the New York crime 
of reckless endangerment.149  Only one appellate decision since Begay has 
                                                                                                                          
143 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2009) (listing murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, 
extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, and the unlawful possession of a firearm 
described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)).  The comment also includes “the offenses of aiding and abetting, 
conspiring, and attempting to commit” crimes of violence.  Id. 
144 Id.  
145 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.  
146 Herrick, 545 F.3d at 57. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 60. 
149 United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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recognized and respected the definitions’ differences.150 
As discussed in the previous section, the Seventh Circuit in United 
States v. Woods held that an Illinois conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter did not constitute a crime of violence because it is not 
purposeful.151  Treating the ACCA and the career offender guideline 
“interchangeably,”152 the Woods court relied entirely on Begay without one 
mention of the “crime of violence” commentary.  Of course, ACCA case 
law should strongly influence the application of the career offender 
guideline, especially where the two do not conflict.  But Woods needed to 
address the apparent conflict between the two: “manslaughter” appears to 
include both involuntary and voluntary manslaughter.  The Guidelines 
commentary cannot be ignored.  As the “equivalent of legislative rules 
adopted by federal agencies,” they bind federal courts unless plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the Guidelines.153  The Seventh Circuit 
chose Begay, which applies only indirectly to the career offender guideline, 
over the guideline’s commentary, which has “controlling weight.”154   
The involuntary manslaughter problem calls into doubt the circuits’ 
application of ACCA case law to the career offender guideline.  If 
“manslaughter” in the crime of violence commentary includes involuntary 
manslaughter, then Begay’s purposeful requirement must not apply to that 
crime.  And if involuntary manslaughter is exempted from Begay’s 
requirement, then perhaps Begay should not apply to the career offender 
guideline at all.  Several factors point in that direction.  First, the Begay 
Court never expressly extended its holding to the residual clause of the 
career offender guideline.  Second, Begay’s “likely shooter” inquiry, 
loosely derived from the title of the ACCA, does not apply to the career 
offender guideline.155  Third, the apparent inclusion of involuntary 
manslaughter in the guideline commentary suggests that crimes of violence 
include crimes of recklessness.  Including such crimes, as long as they pose 
a serious potential risk of physical injury, is perfectly compatible with the 
text of the career offender guideline.  Therefore, the commentary’s 
inclusion of crimes of recklessness should enjoy controlling weight.  Judge 
Colloton has added another reason why courts should not interchangeably 
treat the two provisions—they were “adopted by different bodies at 
                                                                                                                          
150 United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1172–75 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that an Arizona 
conviction for attempted second-degree burglary qualifies as a crime of violence but not a violent 
felony because the guideline commentary expressly includes inchoate offenses).   
151 576 F.3d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 2009). 
152 Id. at 404.  
153 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). 
154 Id.   
155 United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the career offender 
guideline “does not single out armed criminals,” and so “[p]erhaps Begay has broken the link between 
§ 924(e) and § 4B1.2”). 
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different times.”156  Lastly, the advisory nature of the Guidelines after 
Booker makes the onerous crime-of-violence determination less necessary.  
Even if a sentencing judge determines that a particular prior conviction is 
not a crime of violence, the judge still has the discretion to issue a greater 
sentence.157  In that light, “elaborate rules . . . that the district judge may 
elect to bypass in the end” look foolish.158  Until the significant differences 
between the career offender guideline and Begay are reconciled, courts’ 
application of Begay to the guideline is unnecessary and unfaithful to the 
guideline commentary.   
C.  “Violent” May Exclude Sex Crimes Against Children 
Another unintended consequence of Begay is that sex crimes against 
children no longer fall under the residual clause in many circuits.  Before 
Begay, circuit courts repeatedly concluded that sex crimes against minors, 
such as sexual assault, statutory rape, and interstate trafficking with the 
intent that the minor engage in prostitution, pose a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.  This idea enjoyed such wide acceptance among 
the circuits that the Tenth Circuit stated unequivocally in 1998: “Every 
published appellate decision which has considered applying the ‘otherwise’ 
clause in the context of sexual offenses involving minors has found a 
‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the minors under U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.2(1)(ii) and has held that the offenses at issue are ‘crimes of 
violence.’”159  Courts held that the residual clause even encompassed 
convictions where the defendant never actually physically injured the 
minor or where the defendant obtained actual consent—because such 
                                                                                                                          
156 United States v. Williams, 546 F.3d 961, 962 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he statute and the guideline were adopted by different bodies at 
different times, . . . the texts of the provisions are not identical, and . . . the Sentencing Commission has 
added authoritative commentary to § 4B1.2, which does not apply to § 924(e).” (citing U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.4, cmt. n.1 (2009))); United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 
969–70 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bell, 445 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Guerra, 962 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 870–72 & n.17 (3d 
Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
definitions are not identical.  The Sentencing Commission was not bound to use for its purposes the 
ACCA definition of violent felony.  Indeed, it chose to use a different term—crime of violence, rather 
than violent felony.”).  
157 Woods, 576 F.3d at 417 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 418.  Nonetheless, district judges must faithfully determine and consider the appropriate 
guideline sentence before deciding to exercise discretion and vary from the guideline’s range.  See Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (noting that a judge “must make an individualized assessment 
based on the facts presented.  If he decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must 
consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to 
support the degree of the variance.”); Holman, supra note 49, at 286 (“[A] sentence is procedurally 
reasonable if the judge considered the appropriate factors, correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines 
range, and adequately stated his reasons.”).  
159 United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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conduct poses a serious potential risk of physical injury.160  Courts 
reasoned that sexual contact between adults and children creates high risks 
of force, physical injury, sexually transmitted diseases, and pregnancy.161   
Begay has changed some circuits’ treatment of sex crimes against 
children.  Begay held that prior felonies fall within the scope of the residual 
clause only if the statutes of conviction require violent and aggressive 
conduct.162  Some sex crimes against minors—particularly statutory rape—
do not require violence or aggression, even though they clearly pose a 
serious potential risk of physical injury under the plain language of the 
residual clause.  Reconsidering their prior precedent after Begay, the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that statutory rape is not a violent 
felony163:  “[B]ecause statutory rape may involve consensual sexual 
intercourse, it does not necessarily involve either ‘violent’ or ‘aggressive’ 
conduct.”164  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that a state conviction for 
sexual assault is not a violent felony because the law, which prohibits nine 
types of sexual conduct including some consensual encounters, “can result 
in convictions for crimes that, while involving purposeful behavior, do not 
involve aggressive and violent behavior.”165  The Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits have also revisited their prior precedent after Begay and held that 
state convictions for statutory rape fall outside the residual clause because 
                                                                                                                          
160 After Begay, the Tenth Circuit held that a state conviction for knowingly taking immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor did not constitute a crime of violence.  United States v. 
Dennis, 551 F.3d 986, 991 (10th Cir. 2008).  The crime, “which requires a jury assessment based on the 
totality of the circumstances and common sense as to whether it has been violated, [does not] 
necessarily involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”   Id. at 
990. 
161 See United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2005) (including pregnancy, 
venereal disease, and physical injury among the risks in child sexual abuse cases); United States v. 
Asberry, 394 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting STDs and “physical risks of pregnancy” as risks 
from statutory rape).  Notably, however, these courts did not substantiate these risks with any statistical 
data.  Research seems to support the high risk of pregnancy: sixty-nine percent of unmarried adolescent 
girls with partners more than six years older become pregnant, 3.7 times the pregnancy rate for the 
same population with partners no more than two years older.  Denise A. Hines & David Finkelhor, 
Statutory Sex Crime Relationships Between Juveniles and Adults: A Review of Social Scientific 
Research, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 300, 303 (2007).  Further, adolescent girls with older 
partners are more likely to contract an STD.  Id. at 307.  Nonetheless, “these studies are correlational,” 
which is to say that the girls’ risky behavior may precede their sexual relationships with older men.  Id.  
Hines and Finkelhor did not mention high risks of force or physical injury.  Still, another study reports: 
“Seventy-four percent of women who had intercourse before age 14 and 60% of those who had sex 
before age 15 report having had a forced sexual experience.”  Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape 
Laws Be Effective in Preventing Adolescent Pregnancy?, 29 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 30, 30 
(1996).  Although these figures are not broken down by the age of the sexual partner, they still show 
greater incidence of forced sex among young girls. 
162 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008). 
163 United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Thornton, 
554 F.3d 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2009).  
164 Christensen, 559 F.3d at 1095 (internal citation omitted).  
165 United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2009); see also OHIO REV. CODE § 
2907.03 (West 2010) (requiring no elements of aggressive or violent behavior to be found guilty of 
sexual battery, a felony of the third degree).  
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the crimes are strict liability offenses.166   
While faithful to the categorical approach and Begay, these results 
seem contrary to the text of the ACCA.  The ACCA’s residual clause 
plainly includes sexual assault as a violent felony, because non-consensual 
sexual contact has a serious potential risk of physical injury.167  Similarly, 
sexual contact with a minor in the form of statutory rape carries grave risks 
of harm, given the high frequency of violence, pregnancy, and STDs, as 
well as the underage victim’s diminished capacity for informed consent 
and legal inability to consent.  Begay creates an end-run around the plain 
language of the statute and allows possibly dangerous sexual predators to 
avoid a longer prison sentence.168 
Other courts have relied on Begay’s “typically” language to 
circumvent the categorical approach and conclude that sex crimes against 
children constitute violent felonies and crimes of violence.169  Begay’s 
“typically” language—along with James’s emphasis on the “ordinary” 
case—has allowed courts to expand the inquiry beyond the statutory 
elements of the offense and consider how the crime is typically committed.  
The Second Circuit took this route in United States v. Daye, explaining, 
“Begay does not require that every instance of a particular crime involve 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”170  Sexual assault of a child is 
violent and aggressive, the Daye court said, because “crimes involving 
sexual contact between adults and children create a substantial likelihood 
of forceful, violent, and aggressive behavior on the part of the perpetrator 
because a child has essentially no ability to deter an adult from using such 
                                                                                                                          
166 United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1230, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that Florida 
conviction for sexual battery of a child under sixteen is not a violent felony under the residual clause 
because it is not categorically “purposeful,” despite “presenting a serious potential risk of physical 
injury”); United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 813–15 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that Wisconsin 
conviction for sexual assault of a child is not a crime of violence after Begay because it is a strict 
liability offense). 
167 United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that simple rape “could 
result in physical injury to the victim,” “is nonetheless a crime against the bodily integrity of the 
victim,” and “also subjects the victim to the physical risks associated with sexually transmitted diseases 
and pregnancy”).  The Ninth Circuit has maintained post-Begay that rape is still a crime of violence, 
even though the Arizona sexual assault statute does not require force or coercion.  United States v. 
Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084, 1089–91 (9th Cir. 2010). 
168 Of course, Begay may also correct the residual clause’s overbreadth by excluding non-
dangerous offenders and saving them from an unnecessarily lengthy sentence.  The author thanks 
Michael O’Hear for this observation.  See Shani Fregia, Statutory Rape: A Crime of Violence for 
Purposes of Immigrant Deportation?, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 539, 555 (2007) (“[T]reating all statutory 
rape offenses in this manner ignores the meaningful variations that exist between cases.”).  
169 See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing a federal 
conviction for transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that the minor engage in 
prostitution); United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing a Vermont 
conviction for sexual abuse of a child); United States v. Wilson, 568 F.3d 670, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing a Missouri conviction for child abuse).  
170 Daye, 571 F.3d at 234; see also Wilson, 568 F.3d at 674 (“[O]ur inquiry under the residual 
clause is focused on whether violent and aggressive conduct is typically involved.”). 
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force to coerce the child into a sexual act.”171  The Eighth Circuit surveyed 
reported Missouri court cases regarding convictions for child abuse and 
found that each one “clearly involves violent and aggressive conduct.”172  
Therefore, the court concluded that child abuse qualified as a violent 
felony even though the statute did not require violent or aggressive 
conduct, but only a consensual sexual act with a person under the age of 
sixteen.173  These cases supplant the requirement that a crime be 
necessarily violent and aggressive with the requirement that a crime be 
violent and aggressive in its “typical” or likely commission.174  Although 
these circuits pay lip service to the categorical approach, this method of 
examining the likely commission of a crime contradicts the categorical 
approach.  As discussed earlier, this problem did not originate with the 
circuit courts; rather, Begay’s imprecise instructions created the confusion.    
Courts are often caught between a rock and a hard place in applying 
Begay to certain prior crimes.  Some courts apply the categorical approach 
to determine whether the prior crime required purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.  This approach remains faithful to the categorical 
approach but often produces unsatisfying results—such as concluding that 
sexual assault of a minor is not a crime of violence.  Other courts take 
advantage of Begay’s “typically” language to circumvent the categorical 
approach and reach the more satisfying result—which appears more in line 
with the ACCA’s statutory text.  These courts must ignore Supreme Court 
precedent mandating the categorical approach, or assume that Begay 
somehow abrogated it with respect to the residual clause of the ACCA.  
D.  The Search for the “Ordinary Case” Abandons the Categorical 
Approach 
1.  Growing Tension Between James/Begay/Chambers and 
Taylor/Shepard 
Lower federal courts now grapple with two nearly contradictory 
instructions from the Supreme Court.  On the one hand is the categorical 
approach as set forth in Taylor and Shepard.  According to the categorical 
approach, a sentencing court may examine only the fact of the conviction 
and the elements of the statutory offense to determine whether a crime is a 
“violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA’s residual clause.175  In a few 
cases, the defendant may be charged under a statute with disjunctive 
elements and the jury is “actually required to find all the elements” of the 
                                                                                                                          
171 Daye, 571 F.3d at 234.  
172 Wilson, 568 F.3d at 674.   
173 Daye, 571 F.3d at 229 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(3)).   
174 See Patterson, 576 F.3d at 442 (holding that transporting a minor in interstate commerce with 
intent that the minor engage in prostitution is violent because it creates a “significant risk of violence”).   
175 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
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crime, including one of the disjunctive elements, in order to convict.176  
Only in those rare situations may the court look to the charging documents, 
jury instructions, or any plea agreement or colloquy to learn under which 
part of the statute the defendant was convicted.177  Besides those narrow 
exceptions, which examine only established facts and admissions actually 
necessary for the conviction, the categorical approach forbids courts from 
examining any other facts underlying the offense.   
On the other hand, James, Begay, and Chambers progressively eroded 
the categorical approach and encouraged sentencing courts to determine 
whether someone could have committed the crime violently.  Although 
James echoed previous categorical approach instructions,178 it claimed that 
the “proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of 
the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury 
to another.”179  As this Article has discussed, inquiring into the “ordinary 
case” likely means looking beyond the elements of the offense and 
charging documents.  Begay provided two further hints that lower courts 
should hypothesize violent means of committing crimes.  First, it held that 
crimes fall under the ACCA’s residual clause if they “typically” involve 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, inviting courts to hypothesize 
the typical commission of the crime.180  Second, it held that a crime is a 
violent felony under the residual clause only if the offender is a likely 
shooter181—“the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and 
pull the trigger.”182  The likely shooter inquiry encourages yet another 
examination of facts beyond the elements of the offense.183   
Presumably set free from the categorical approach, circuit courts now 
frequently ask whether a particular crime is typically committed violently, 
or involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, in “the ordinary 
case.”  This inquiry takes three slightly different but overlapping forms, 
which this Article terms the imaginary ordinary crime exercise, the smell 
test, and the statistical perspective.  
2.  The Great Search for the “Ordinary Case” 
a.  The Imaginary Ordinary Crime 
In order to determine whether a crime is violent and aggressive in the 
                                                                                                                          
176 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). 
177 See supra note 46–48 and accompanying text for a discussion of restrictions on the court’s 
fact-finding. 
178 See supra notes 51–57. 
179 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (emphasis added).  See supra notes 56–57 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the “ordinary case” in James. 
180 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra note 69–70 and accompanying text. 
182 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008). 
183 For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the ACCA, see supra Part III.B. 
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“ordinary case,” courts often employ their collective imaginations to 
hypothesize how a crime might play out.  In United States v. Billups, the 
Seventh Circuit applied Begay to the career offender guideline and the 
defendant’s argument that false imprisonment is not a crime of violence 
because it can be committed in a non-violent way.184  In Wisconsin, one 
may be convicted of false imprisonment for imprisoning another without 
his consent.185  But imprisonment “without consent” may be effected in 
one of four ways under the statute: by overcoming the non-consenting 
victim, by fear through the use or threat of imminent use of physical 
violence, purporting to act under legal authority, or by reason of the 
victim’s ignorance or mistake of fact or law.186  The first two scenarios 
clearly involve some violence or threat of violence.187  But the court found 
that the latter two scenarios, in which the perpetrator’s trickery prevents 
consent, have sufficient potential for violence because “the victim may 
discover” the trickery and resist.188  The court acknowledged that the fourth 
method of false imprisonment, by reason of the victim’s ignorance or 
mistake of fact or law, could be committed without the risk of violence 
where a child victim avoids any physical confrontation.189  Nonetheless, 
“that there exists a single possible way, among many, to commit the 
offense without posing a serious risk of injury to another does not mean 
that, in the ordinary case, the offense does not present such a risk.”190  The 
Billups court took the “ordinary case” route to the exclusion of the 
categorical approach: instead of only examining the elements of the 
offense, which arguably do not require violent conduct, the court imagined 
how the offense might play out.191  
In United States v. Spells, another Seventh Circuit panel imagined the 
ordinary crime.  The Spells court addressed whether an Indiana conviction 
for resisting law enforcement constitutes a “violent felony” under the 
ACCA.192  Under the Indiana statute, one may resist law enforcement by 
one of three means: by forcibly resisting a law enforcement officer, by 
forcibly resisting service of a process or order from a court, or by fleeing a 
law enforcement officer.193   
Spells defied the categorical approach in two ways.  First, Spells 
initially decided whether one of the disjunctive provisions, fleeing law 
                                                                                                                          
184 536 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2008). 
185 Id. at 577 (citing WIS. STAT. § 940.30).  
186 Id. at 579 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.22(48)). 
187 Id. at 581. 
188 Id. (emphasis added). 
189 Id.  
190 Id. at 582 (emphasis added). 
191 Id. at 580–83.  The court also applied Begay in passing, finding that “false imprisonment 
always involves purposeful behavior and typically involves aggressive, violent behavior.”  Id. at 583. 
192 United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2008). 
193 Id. at 749 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)). 
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enforcement, is a crime of violence.194  But both the categorical 
approach195 and Seventh Circuit precedent196 require courts initially to 
determine under which disjunctive provision of the statute the defendant 
was convicted.  Spells unnecessarily reached the merits, because it should 
have remanded the case to the district court.  Second, in holding that 
fleeing an officer qualifies as a violent felony,197 Spells’s application of 
Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test did not stick to the 
statutory elements of the prior conviction.  This crime is purposeful 
because the statute requires that one “knowingly or intentionally” flee an 
officer.198  Fleeing an officer in a vehicle, the court reasoned, is “inherently 
aggressive, despite Indiana law’s absence of a requirement that the 
conduct endanger others.”199  This is so, the court said, because the officer 
will likely give chase thereby endangering himself and others on the 
road.200  Further, using Begay’s “likely shooter” inquiry, the court 
hypothesized that one fleeing the police may have a firearm, and that such 
a person “would have a greater propensity to use that firearm in an effort to 
evade arrest.”201  Based only on these hypotheticals and considerations 
well beyond the elements of the offense, Spells held that the crime of 
fleeing law enforcement qualifies as a violent felony.202   
                                                                                                                          
194 Id. at 750 (“Spells claims that the district court failed to properly determine which subsection 
of this statute he was convicted under. Whether such a procedural violation occurred is only of 
significance if certain Class D felony violations of Indiana’s Resisting Law Enforcement offense would 
not constitute a ‘violent felony.’”).  Whether fleeing law enforcement is a crime of violence was not 
actually the issue before the court until it determined that Spells was convicted under that clause of the 
resisting law enforcement statute.  Id.  
195 See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.  
196 Spells, 537 F.3d at 749 (stating that the court may consult the charging document, plea 
agreement or colloquy or “some comparable judicial record of this information . . . ‘[o]nly where the 
statutory elements and the content of the charging document do not resolve whether the crime of 
conviction constitutes a [violent felony]’” (quoting United States v. Newbern, 479 F.3d 506, 508 (7th 
Cir. 2007))).   
197 Id. at 752. 
198 Id.  
199 Id. (emphasis added).  The Indiana statute contemplates but does not require that the offender 
use a vehicle.  See also IND. CODE 35-44-3-3(a)(3) (2009) (stating that a person who knowingly or 
intentionally resists law enforcement when he or she “flees from a law enforcement officer after the 
officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or 
emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop”).    
200 Id. 
201 Id.  Spells also cited Department of Justice statistics for this proposition.  See infra V.D.2.c. 
202 Three other circuits have concluded that fleeing law enforcement is a violent felony.  Citing 
Spells for the notion that fleeing law enforcement invites chase, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. 
West held in conclusory fashion, “[t]here is little doubt that knowingly flaunting the order of a police 
officer is aggressive conduct.”  550 F.3d 952, 969 (10th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Wise, 597 
F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming West and holding that Utah crime of failing to stop at the 
command of a police officer was a crime of violence).   As for Begay’s violence requirement, the crime 
“will typically lead to a confrontation with the officer being disobeyed,” and the likelihood of a chase 
increases “the likelihood of serious harm to the officers involved as well as any bystanders that by 
happenstance get in the way . . . .”  Id. at 970.  The Fifth and Sixth Circuits echoed Spells’s and West’s 
reasoning: the crime is aggressive because it is a “clear challenge to the officer’s authority and typically 
initiates pursuit.”  United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Spells, 537 F.3d 
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A recent Seventh Circuit panel has reinforced Spells’s hypothetical 
approach, despite acknowledging that decision’s faults.  In United States v. 
Dismuke, the court held that a Wisconsin conviction for vehicular fleeing 
qualifies as a violent felony.203  The court could have simply affirmed the 
sentence based on Spells because the Indiana crime addressed a sufficiently 
similar crime.  But in light of more recent case law and Spells’s failure to 
“address whether fleeing is ‘violent’ in the way required by Begay,” 
Dismuke considered the issue anew.204  First, the court set out its version of 
the categorical approach.  The Begay test does not apply only to the 
elements of the crime, the court reasoned, but rather to the “generic crime 
as ordinarily committed” or, to repeat James’s formulation, “the conduct 
encompassed by the statutory elements of the crime, in the ordinary or 
typical case.”205  Second, the statutory elements of the crime must require a 
“purposeful” mens rea.  The violent and aggressive requirements, however, 
are more flexible, requiring “only that a residual-clause predicate crime be 
characterized by aggressive conduct with a similar potential for violence 
and therefore injury as the enumerated offenses, not that it must ‘insist on’ 
or require a violent act.”206  With this reasoning, Dismuke whittled the 
Begay test down to one indispensable element (a purposeful mens rea), 
effectively eliminated the violent element, and obscured the aggressive 
element.   
Against these permissive versions of the categorical approach and 
Begay, the Wisconsin conviction for vehicular fleeing easily qualified as a 
violent felony.  Dismuke uncritically adopted the reasoning of Spells and 
its progeny, the Tenth Circuit’s West decision, the Fifth Circuit’s Harrimon 
decision, and the Sixth Circuit’s United States v. LaCasse207 decision, that 
the crime “in the ordinary case” likely leads to a chase.208  The court 
briefly distinguished the contrary holding of the Eleventh Circuit209 on the 
basis that the Wisconsin statute requires accelerated speed or extinguishing 
vehicle lights.210  Although the Minnesota statute at issue in United States 
                                                                                                                          
at 752); see also United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2009).  It is violent because the 
police officer must typically overcome the criminal’s use of force and the criminal will typically 
attempt to flee by any means necessary.  Young, 580 F.3d at 378; Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 535. 
203 593 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2010).  Although the Wisconsin vehicular fleeing statute is 
divisible, the court determined from the criminal complaint that Dismuke was convicted of 
“increas[ing] the speed of the operator’s vehicle or extinguish[ing] the lights of the vehicle in an 
attempt to elude or flee” in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3) (2010).  Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 590. 
204 Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 593.  “Wisconsin’s fleeing offense is narrower than Indiana’s, so it is 
tempting to simply accept the government’s argument and rely on Spells as subsuming the question 
presented here.  But in light of an analytical omission we have noted in Spells and intervening 
developments in the caselaw, we think the issue calls for independent consideration.”  Id. at 592.   
205 Id. at 594.  This phrasing comes directly from James.  See supra note 57.  
206 Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 594. 
207 567 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2009). 
208 Id. at 591 n.3, 595. 
209 United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2009). 
210 Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 591 n.3. 
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v. Tyler contained those same requirements,211 Dismuke avoided engaging 
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that the crime could not be a violent felony 
because its elements do not require a confrontation, chase or violent and 
aggressive conduct.212  Dismuke’s resolution of Spells’s analytical 
omission is not satisfactory.  Despite an impressive windup that diluted the 
categorical approach and Begay, the final analysis did not make a more 
convincing case that vehicular fleeing is categorically a violent felony.  
Instead, the court’s logic mirrored Spells and other circuits’ repetition of 
Spells’s reasoning.  Ultimately, felons facing sentencing in the Seventh 
Circuit for illegally possessing a firearm could still receive a minimum of 
fifteen years of imprisonment based on the judicial guess that vehicular 
fleeing is violent.213     
Certainly, there is nothing grossly unreasonable about these courts’ 
educated guesses as to how a crime typically plays out.  However, the 
scenarios depend entirely on the judges’ imaginations, not what is 
necessary under the statute to commit the crime.  In order to be convicted 
of fleeing a law enforcement officer, the criminal need only disobey a 
police officer’s order to stop.  In some states, a conviction requires even 
less.  Minnesota’s fleeing statute, for example, “criminalizes conduct that 
is neither violent nor aggressive, such as merely ‘extinguish[ing] motor 
vehicle headlights or taillights.’”214  Turning off headlights is not 
necessarily violent or aggressive except in a world unconnected to the 
statute of the prior conviction.  Although the Eighth Circuit held that a 
Minnesota fleeing conviction is not a crime of violence, the Seventh or 
Tenth Circuits could imagine that the mine run of such fleeing convictions 
are violent and aggressive, just as those courts did in Spells and West.215  
At Begay’s invitation, circuit courts enter this imaginary world apparently 
in order to avoid the unsatisfying results required by the categorical 
approach.   
A recent Eighth Circuit opinion exemplifies the constitutional 
problems with the imaginary approach.  In United States v. Williams, the 
Eighth Circuit held that Missouri convictions for auto theft without consent 
and auto tampering are not crimes of violence under the career offender 
                                                                                                                          
211 See infra text accompanying note 214. 
212 Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 591 n.3, 596. 
213 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in United States v. Sykes, another Seventh Circuit 
case affirming Spells and Dismuke, for the October 2010 Term.  598 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 2010 WL 2345244 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010) (No. 09-11311). 
214 Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.487 subd. 1 (2009)).  Tyler held that a 
Minnesota conviction for fleeing a police officer is not a crime of violence.  Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726.  
But see United States v. Malloy, Nos. 09-2618, 09-2619, 2010 WL 3061922, at *9–11 (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 
2010) (distinguishing the Iowa crime of eluding a pursuing law enforcement officer from the 
Minnesota crime of fleeing a police officer at issue in Tyler and holding that the Iowa crime is violent 
and aggressive because it requires one to exceed the speed limit by more than twenty-five m.p.h.). 
215 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.  
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guideline.216  Auto theft without consent requires only the act of taking 
another’s vehicle with the purpose to deprive,217 and tampering “may be 
committed by merely receiving, possessing, selling, altering, or defacing 
an automobile.”218  Overruling pre-Begay circuit precedent, the panel 
concluded that these types of auto theft did not qualify as crimes of 
violence because auto theft without consent does not demonstrate a 
“proclivity for violence and aggression” similar to auto theft by force, and 
auto theft by tampering “includes a range of conduct that is neither violent 
nor aggressive.”219  In a dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing 
en banc, Judge Colloton chastised the panel for unduly overruling pre-
Begay circuit precedent on the issue.220  Quoting pre-Begay case law, 
Colloton argued that auto theft without consent is violent not because of its 
statutory elements, but because of the “likelihood of confrontation.”221  
Once the thief drives away with the vehicle, he is unlawfully 
in possession of a potentially deadly or dangerous  
weapon . . . .  Under the stress and urgency which will 
naturally attend his situation, the thief will likely drive 
recklessly and turn any pursuit into a high-speed chase with 
the potential for serious harm to police or innocent 
bystanders.222  
This imaginary commission of auto theft is several leaps from what the 
Missouri statute actually requires.  Judge Colloton’s argument had 
persuasive value before Begay because auto theft arguably presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury.  But before or after Begay, the 
hypothetical crime has never been within the ambit of the categorical 
approach.  The elements of auto theft do not require dangerous behavior, 
much less violent and aggressive behavior.  The prosecutor in the prior 
case did not have to prove violent and aggressive conduct to obtain a 
conviction.  The defendant accordingly lacked the opportunity to test the 
government’s evidence and offer his own in defense.  A jury of the 
defendant’s peers did not weigh the evidence and find that the offender 
acted with violence or aggression, as would be required by the Sixth 
Amendment if violence and aggression were elements of the statutory 
offense.  When judges impose their own, imaginary version of events, they 
rob defendants not only of the protection of the categorical approach but 
                                                                                                                          
216 United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 974–76 (8th Cir. 2008). 
217 MO. REV. STAT. § 570.030 (West 1999).  
218 Williams, 537 F.3d at 974. 
219 Id.  
220 United States v. Williams, 546 F.3d 961, 961 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
221 Williams, 546 F.3d at 963. 
222 Id. 
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more importantly their basic constitutional rights.  
b.  The Smell Test 
Rather than engage in these imaginary gymnastics to arrive at the 
ordinary commission of a crime, some appellate courts utilize a “smell” 
test, much like Justice Potter Stewart’s pornography standard.223  In United 
States v. Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit held that a Texas conviction for 
possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution qualified as a violent 
felony.224  Before Begay, a court could certainly find that possessing a 
deadly weapon in prison presents a serious potential risk of physical injury, 
as the Tenth Circuit had.225  But Begay forced the Tenth Circuit to consider 
whether the “purposeful” requirement, under the categorical approach, bars 
a crime requiring mens rea of “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.”226  
Because one could “recklessly” possess a deadly weapon under the statute, 
a strict application of the categorical approach would require a sentencing 
court to find that such a crime was not a violent felony.  The Zuniga court 
did not strictly apply the categorical approach.  The statute need not 
require purposeful conduct, Zuniga held, citing Begay’s “typically” 
language: “It is reasonable to surmise that those who possess deadly 
weapons in a penal institution typically intend to possess them.”227  Based 
on that conclusory reasoning, the Tenth Circuit held that the offense is 
purposeful.228  Notably, the Tenth Circuit had an alternate—and far more 
intellectually satisfying—justification for this conclusion.  Despite the 
statute’s recitation of the word “recklessly,” Texas courts have interpreted 
the statute as requiring purposeful possession.229  The court could have 
rested its outcome on the judicial construction of the Texas statute, but it 
unnecessarily relied on a legally questionable assumption.  Adopting 
Zuniga’s reasoning, two other circuits have assumed that possession of a 
dangerous weapon is necessarily purposeful.230 
                                                                                                                          
223 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I know it when I see  
it . . . .”). 
224 United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir. 2009). 
225 Id. at 1333 (citing United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 1334 (emphasis added). 
228 Id. at 1334–35. 
229 Id. 
230 In United States v. Polk, the Third Circuit considered whether a federal conviction for 
possession of a prohibited object designed to be used as a weapon is a crime of violence.  577 F.3d 515, 
520 (3d Cir. 2009).  Polk assumed that the strict liability crime was purposeful “in that we may assume 
one who possesses a shank intends that possession . . . .”  Id. at 519 (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, 
Polk expressly broke from Zuniga and held that the crime is not a crime of violence because “it cannot 
properly be characterized as conduct that is itself aggressive or violent, as only the potential exists for 
aggressive or violent conduct.”  Id. 
The Eighth Circuit followed and expanded Zuniga beyond the prison context to an Arkansas 
conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun.  United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 827 (8th 
Cir. 2009).  First, citing Zuniga, Vincent held that “[p]ossession of a dangerous weapon that has no 
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The Eleventh Circuit used only judicial intuition in United States v. 
Harrison to determine that a Florida conviction for willfully fleeing a 
police officer is not a violent felony.231  The offense requires only that a 
person willfully flee or attempt to elude a law enforcement officer driving 
a marked patrol vehicle with sirens and lights activated.232  Based on the 
Supreme Court’s direction to determine the “ordinary case,”233 Harrison 
said that the court must ascertain how the crime is “ordinarily 
committed.”234  Any commission of the offense must be purposeful, given 
the statute’s mens rea of “willfully.”235  Addressing Begay’s violence 
prong, the court supposed that the disobedience of fleeing “does not always 
translate into a serious potential risk of physical injury.”236  Nor does the 
crime pass Begay’s “likely shooter” test.  If the statute criminalized 
“driving away recklessly without regard for the safety of others,” the court 
said, “[s]uch callousness and indifference to the lives of others [would] 
smack more of the kind of person that might ‘deliberately point the gun 
and pull the trigger.’”237  In contrast, willfully fleeing “suggests an 
unwillingness to engage in violent conduct . . . .  [T]hat kind of person is 
not, in our mind, cut from the same cloth as burglars, arsonists, 
extortionists, or those that criminally detonate explosives.”238  By using 
terms of analysis such as “smack” and “cut from the same cloth,” the court 
in Harrison appeared to base its holding on its gut feeling about the crime.  
Of the three inquiries, the “smell” test is the most detached from the 
categorical approach—a subjective, judicial sense of the crime showing 
little regard for the elements of the offense.   
c.  The Judge as Statistician 
Applying a third approach to identify the “ordinary case,” some courts 
have used statistics, adding the patina of objectivity to an essentially 
                                                                                                                          
lawful purpose creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.”  Id. at 825 (citing Zuniga, 
553 F.3d at 1334).  Vincent’s paltry analysis of “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” was based entirely 
on Zuniga.  “The Zuniga court reasoned that a statute reaching intentional, knowing, or reckless 
conduct could still fall within the ‘otherwise’ clause of § 924(e) because violations of such statutes 
‘typically’ involve purposeful conduct.”  Id. at 827 (citing Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1334–35).  Like the 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun, the Vincent court said, the possession of a weapon in prison “is 
violent and aggressive because it ‘creates the possibility—even the likelihood—of a future violent 
confrontation.’”  Id. (quoting Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1335).  Vincent offered no support for the holding 
that possession of a sawed-off shotgun is necessarily purposeful, violent, and aggressive, other than 
Zuniga’s surmise and its conclusory statement that possession of “a weapon with no lawful purpose . . . 
is purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”  Id. 
231 United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009). 
232 FLA. STAT. § 316.1935(2) (2006).   
233 Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1284–85 (quoting Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 690 
(2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)). 
234 Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1285. 
235 Id. at 1293. 
236 Id. at 1294. 
237 Id. at 1295 (emphasis added) (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 146). 
238 Id. at 1295–96 (emphasis added). 
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subjective exercise.  Admittedly, as the James Court observed, “serious 
potential risk” is an “inherently probabilistic concept.”239  But because 
many judges are amateur statisticians, they are likely to misapply statistics.  
The most basic problem with this use of statistics, though, is that no one 
knows what to measure.  Even if used accurately, the chosen metric for the 
“ordinary case” shifts from judge to judge.  Both the Supreme Court and 
the circuit courts have demonstrated the dangers of the statistical approach.  
The Supreme Court’s use of “conclusive” statistics in Chambers was 
approximate at best.240  To determine whether those who commit the crime 
of failure to report to a penal institution are likely shooters, Chambers 
utilized a Sentencing Commission report detailing the frequency of a 
criminal’s violence while escaping or failing to report to a penal 
institution.241  The Sentencing Commission had drafted the report at the 
suggestion of the Seventh Circuit panel in Chambers.242  Analyzing the 
previous two years, the Commission identified federal cases in which the 
defendant received the sentencing guideline enhancement for “Escape, 
Instigating or Assisting Escape.”243  After identifying 414 such cases, the 
Commission then examined whether the escape was committed with force 
or a dangerous weapon or whether the escape caused anyone injury.244  
Such a measurement, of course, excludes any violent offenders who 
benefited from prosecutorial discretion or were convicted in state court.  
Nonetheless, because none of the catalogued “failure to report” offenses in 
the previous two years involved violence, Chambers concluded that the 
crime did not constitute a “violent felony.”245   
Following this statistical approach, the law categorizes crimes as 
violent felonies depending on how most criminals actually commit them.  
If the use of violence in commission of a particular crime significantly 
increased over a two-year period, the law categorizing that crime could 
change just as quickly.  This approach and its small sample size create 
more problems.  Courts could never rely on past precedent but would have 
to reassess continually whether a crime had become—or ceased to be—a 
violent felony, depending on how felons in recent years had chosen to 
commit that particular crime.  Constant statistical reassessment would raise 
questions regarding the standard of review.  Now, courts review the 
                                                                                                                          
239 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 207 (2007). 
240 Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009). 
241 Id. (“The question is whether such an offender is significantly more likely than others to 
attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a ‘serious potential risk of physical 
injury.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006))). 
242 Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727.  
243 Chambers, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
2P1.1). 
244 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON FEDERAL ESCAPE OFFENSES IN FISCAL YEARS 2006 
AND 2007, 6 (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/escape_FY0607_final.pdf. 
245 Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692–93. 
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determination of whether a crime constitutes a violent felony under the 
ACCA de novo, as a matter of law.  But to the extent that statistics form 
the factual basis for the legal conclusion, appellate courts might owe some 
deference to the district court’s statistical findings.  On the other hand, 
many months could pass between sentencing and appellate review, enough 
time for new and different statistics to develop.  If the violent felony 
determination is legal, perhaps the appellate courts should consider those 
new statistics de novo.  The mixed legal/factual nature of and the constant 
developments surrounding any statistical analysis may complicate an 
already onerous task.  A sample size larger than the two-year period 
analyzed in Chambers would likely stabilize the statistics of particular 
crimes and alleviate many of these burdens.   
The Seventh Circuit has demonstrated a particular affinity for the 
statistical approach.  Its decision in Spells246 used—or rather, misused—
statistics to conclude that one who flees law enforcement is a likely 
shooter.  The court employed Department of Justice statistics showing that 
one in four “inmates convicted for brandishing or displaying a firearm[] 
had used the gun in this manner . . . to get away.”247  Somehow, Spells 
completely inverted that statistic, claiming that the statistic indicated the 
offender’s increased “propensity to use that firearm in an effort to evade 
arrest.”248  The statistic refers to the number of criminals convicted of 
brandishing a firearm who had used that firearm to “get away” from law 
enforcement in one way or another.  It says nothing about the frequency of 
criminals convicted of fleeing law enforcement who brandished a firearm.  
Spells misconstrued the statistic another way: Begay asked whether the 
prior offense is violent, not necessarily whether the prior offense involved 
a firearm.  The presence of one does not necessarily lead to the presence of 
another.  Still, that distorted evidence supported the court’s conclusion that 
the crime is a violent felony.249 
Another post-Begay decision from the Seventh Circuit, United States v. 
Templeton, strongly favored the use of statistics in discerning whether a 
crime is a crime of violence under the career offender guideline.250  Before 
applying Begay, the court examined the risk of physical injury in 
Wisconsin convictions for escape and failure to report.251  The defendant 
                                                                                                                          
246 United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2008). 
247 Id. at 752 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 752–53 (“This link between using a vehicle to flee an officer, and that same individual’s 
likelihood of using a gun when fleeing in the future, distinguishes this crime from those listed by the 
Court in Begay as being ‘dangerous,’ but not reflective of someone ‘whom one normally labels [an] 
armed career criminal[].’” (alteration in Spells) (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 
(2008))). 
250 543 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a statute inquires into risk, data trump judicial 
guesses.”). 
251 Id. at 381–82. 
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presented statistics showing that these crimes entailed violence only eleven 
percent to fifteen percent of the time.252  That figure was based on the 
indictments of those convicted of failure to report and escape and whether 
they were also “charged under one of four statutes punishing some form of 
resisting arrest . . . .”253  The more relevant question, for purposes of the 
categorical approach, is whether the defendants were also convicted of 
resisting arrest.  Templeton acknowledged that an indictment alleging 
“forceful resistance to arrest does not establish that violence occurred.”254  
Nonetheless, an eleven percent to fifteen percent incidence of injury is 
“serious,” the court said, relying on precedent that even “a 2% incidence of 
injury from a crime renders the risk ‘serious.’”255  More reliable statistics, 
however, showed that violence occurred during escapes between 2.7% and 
eight percent of the time.256  Even that low frequency, the court said, is a 
“sufficient risk of injury” for escape to count as a crime of violence.257   
Once the court established the risk of violence, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of a violent felony, it applied Begay.258  Both escape 
and failure to report are purposeful and could be committed in violent or 
nonviolent ways, though neither crime requires violence or aggression.  
Failure to report is certainly not a violent felony, the court quickly held,259 
but escape may be.260  The difference between the court’s treatments of the 
two crimes, it appears, is the slight statistical likelihood of violence of 
escape, even though the court did not present any comparable statistics on 
failure to report.  Because of that small likelihood, the court remanded so 
that the district court could “determine in what way the defendant 
committed the offense.”261  
Templeton exemplified the pitfalls of the statistical approach, even 
where judges use statistics accurately.  Goalposts move, depending on the 
court or the judge.  How violent is violent?  For some judges on the 
                                                                                                                          
252 Id. at 381.   
253 Id.  
254 Id. at 382.   
255 Id. at 381. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 382. 
259 Id. at 383 (“A walkaway is not a crime of violence under Begay.  Nor is a simple failure to 
report to custody . . . .”). 
260 Id. at 382 (“Escapes that entail violence . . . involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct.” (internal quotations marks omitted)) . 
261 Id. at 384.  The statistical approach has its detractors.  Another Seventh Circuit panel, in 
United States v. Hart, 578 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2009), doubted that statistics can help determine whether 
a crime is necessarily violent.  The Hart court held that a conviction for the federal crime of escape is 
not a crime of violence because “one can commit escape under the federal statute without putting 
oneself, or anyone else, in harm’s way.”  Id. at 681.  Chambers did not establish that “there is some 
statistical cutoff separating violent from non-violent crimes . . . .”  Id.  Rather, the statistics in 
Chambers merely “elucidate the difficulties inherent in attempting to ascribe a single violent or non-
violent ‘nature’ to crimes committed under such a broadly applicable statute.”  Id. 
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Seventh Circuit, a two percent incidence of violence during the 
commission of a particular crime demonstrates that the crime is legally 
violent.  The placement of that line seems arbitrary.  If an incidence as low 
as two percent is violent, then perhaps any likelihood greater than zero will 
qualify the crime as legally violent.  Courts may use statistics to confirm 
“intuitive” beliefs that a crime is violent or not.262  As Judge Alex Kozinski 
recently wrote, there is no basis in the law for determining whether “most 
of the cases” involve dangerous conduct: “Don’t even think about how a 
court is supposed to figure out whether a statute is applied in a certain way 
‘most of the time.’  (A statistical analysis of the state reporter?  A survey?  
Expert evidence?  Google?  Gut instinct?)”263   
Without any standards, the statistical approach is a dressed-up version 
of the imaginary ordinary crime approach and the smell test.  Ultimately, 
they are all subjective inquiries that guesstimate the violence of crimes 
whose elements do not require violent conduct.  These methods clearly 
conflict with the categorical approach.  Further, under this method, the 
ACCA and its definition of “violent felony” lack independent meaning—
they change according to criminals’ behavior from one year to the next.  
And the law varies even more widely depending on a court’s chosen 
metric.  Such a capricious method of statutory interpretation cannot 
adequately place offenders on notice of which actions trigger the ACCA 
and its fifteen-year minimum sentence or the career offender guideline and 
its sixteen-level sentencing enhancement.   
VI.  RECONCILING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH, BEGAY, AND THE TEXT 
OF THE ACCA 
Lower courts interpreting the ACCA’s residual clause face a difficult 
task: reconciling the statutory text, the categorical approach, and Begay’s 
requirement that the crimes be “typically” purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive.  This Article has presented three major problems with the post-
Begay application of the residual clause.  First, James and Begay supplied 
the tools to deviate from the categorical approach.  James’s “ordinary 
case” language, Begay’s invitation to examine how an offense is 
“typically” committed, and Begay’s likely shooter consideration create 
room for courts to look beyond the statutory elements of the prior 
conviction.  Second, Begay created the temptation to deviate from the 
categorical approach.  If courts strictly apply the categorical approach and 
Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement, they are forced 
                                                                                                                          
262 Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009) (“The upshot is that the study strongly 
supports the intuitive belief that failure to report does not involve a serious potential risk of physical 
injury.”). 
263 United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
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to exclude crimes involving conduct that clearly presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury.  The “purposeful” requirement seems to 
exclude some seriously risky crimes of negligence and recklessness, and 
creates tension with the career offender sentencing guideline.  The 
“violent” requirement excludes many sex crimes against children.  Lower 
courts are placed in the unenviable position of holding that seriously risky 
crimes are not violent felonies.  Third, some lower courts are using the 
supplied tools to deviate from the categorical approach or to ignore some 
or all of Begay’s key holding.   
The status quo is untenable.  Given wide latitude by Begay’s 
ambiguous instructions, some lower courts actively circumvent the 
categorical approach to avoid a strict application of Begay’s “purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive” test and include crimes that clearly present a 
serious risk of physical injury.  These courts need a new framework that 
includes more of these crimes while faithfully applying Begay and the 
categorical approach.   
A new framework that addresses most of Begay’s problems is 
available.  An examination of the alternative paths separates the better 
practices from the poor practices.  After Begay, lower courts can choose 
from a few different combinations of the categorical approach and Begay’s 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement.  A court could apply the 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to the statutory elements of the 
prior convictions strictly following the categorical approach.  By ignoring 
the “ordinary case,” this path excludes some crimes that should plainly 
qualify under the text of the residual clause, like negligent vehicular 
homicide in United States v. Gray264 and sexual assault in United States v. 
Wynn.265  The other options dilute either the categorical approach or the 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement.  One option is to apply 
the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement to the “typical” or 
“ordinary case,” effectively ignoring the categorical approach.  This path 
includes more crimes that should qualify under the text of the residual 
clause, like fleeing law enforcement in United States v. West.266  The third 
option is to apply a diluted “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” 
requirement (by ignoring some elements or disregarding it altogether) 
while strictly following the categorical approach.  Judge Easterbrook’s 
dissent in Woods exemplifies this option, which would also include more 
crimes that qualify under the text of the residual clause.267   
                                                                                                                          
264 535 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2008). 
265 579 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009).  For a discussion of the residual clause and crimes of sexual 
assault, see supra Part V.C.  
266 550 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 2008); see also supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing 
appellate courts’ treatment of the crime of fleeing law enforcement under the residual clause). 
267 See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Easterbrook’s dissent 
in Woods. 
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A fourth option, exemplified by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Dismuke,268 deserves an especially close look.  As 
discussed above, Dismuke held that a Wisconsin conviction for vehicular 
fleeing is a violent felony, based on Spells and its progeny from other 
circuits.269  Leading up to that basic holding, though, the court laid out a 
framework that diluted both the categorical approach and Begay’s test by 
relying on the Supreme Court’s “typically” and “ordinary case” language.  
Not “every conceivable violation of the statute [of the offense must] meet 
the Begay test.”270  Instead, the court examined “the conduct encompassed 
by the statutory elements of the crime, in the ordinary or typical  
case . . . .”271  By this rendering of the categorical approach, Begay applies 
to the ordinary commission of the crime as the court imagines it.   
Turning to the impact of Begay, Dismuke minimized the “purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive” requirement more than any other appellate court to 
date.  First, the court emphasized Begay’s holding that a residual clause 
crime must present a risk of injury similar in kind and degree to the 
enumerated crimes.272  Second, Dismuke treated “purposeful” as a hard-
and-fast element of Begay’s test, but regarded “violent and aggressive” as 
much more flexible.  The court argued that residual clause crimes must 
have a mens rea of “purposeful” or “intentional” conduct because all of the 
enumerated crimes are purposeful.273  But that statement is not accurate: 
“crimes involving the use of explosives” may not require any mens rea, as 
Justice Scalia pointed out in his Begay concurrence.274  Begay’s “violent 
and aggressive” requirement, though, is less demanding in the eyes of the 
Dismuke court because the enumerated crimes do not “invariably involve 
acts of violence.”275  Rather, “violent and aggressive” is merely “a 
descriptive phrase,” characterizing the crimes’ common “aggressive 
conduct that carries the genuine potential for violence.”276  Therefore, “the 
‘violent and aggressive’ limitation requires only that a residual-clause 
predicate crime be characterized by aggressive conduct with a similar 
potential for violence.”277  In the aggregate, these dilutions of Begay 
require only purposeful mens rea and that the statutory elements of the 
crime be “encompassed” by aggressive conduct with a potential for 
violence similar to that of the enumerated crimes.   
Although Dismuke thoroughly analyzed Begay in light of the ACCA’s 
                                                                                                                          
268 United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2010). 
269 Id. at 596. 
270 Id. at 594. 
271 Id. (emphasis added).   
272 Id. at 591–92. 
273 Id. at 592. 
274 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 158 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
275 Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 594.  
276 Id.  
277 Id.  
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text, its approach still suffers from a glaring inconsistency with Supreme 
Court precedent: it plainly examines information beyond “‘the fact of 
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’”278  With each 
careful step, Dismuke narrowed Begay to require only a “purposeful” mens 
rea.  The remainder of Begay’s test, “violent and aggressive,” is so 
weakened that a court can effectively ignore “violent” and focus on the 
presence of what it deems to be “aggressive” conduct, even though the 
government never had to prove such an element to convict.  Admittedly, 
the Dismuke court had to pick through the Supreme Court’s conflicting 
signals and choose a reasonable path.  And the court largely succeeded.   
Vehicular fleeing seems like a violent felony according to the text of the 
residual clause, and the “typically” and “ordinary case” language from 
Begay and James support a diluted categorical approach.   
But the categorical approach is the one aspect of ACCA jurisprudence 
that should not yield, given its grounding in the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial,279 even if that means excluding some extremely risky crimes.  
All four of the outlined paths carry the same disadvantage: minimizing or 
disregarding an aspect of the Supreme Court’s ACCA precedent.  The 
question is which solution both faithfully adheres to precedent, and 
includes as many crimes as possible that qualify as violent felonies under 
the plain text of the residual clause (crimes involving conduct that presents 
a serious risk of potential injury to another).  Such a solution must give the 
categorical approach priority over other strains of the Supreme Court’s 
ACCA precedent.  The categorical approach has major drawbacks.  Its 
complex steps can easily trip up a court examining the statutory elements 
of a conviction, especially when the statute contains disjunctive elements, 
and its inflexibility may not accommodate statutes not written with the 
ACCA or Begay’s three-part test in mind.280  But basic principles of 
fairness and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial mandate that 
sentencing courts consider only the legal elements and admissions of the 
prior conviction, not hypothetical visions of that crime.  Given the 
significant ambiguity still surrounding the residual clause even after a 
series of Supreme Court decisions and scores of appellate decisions, the 
                                                                                                                          
278 Id. at 589 (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005)). 
279 See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the categorical approach and the 
ACCA. 
280 A strict categorical approach would also minimize the courts’ time spent analyzing crimes: 
either the crime’s statutory elements contain the necessarily elements or not.  The “ordinary case” 
approach, in contrast, tends to require much more thought and labor; however, some courts simply state 
that the crime increases the likelihood of a confrontation without any further analysis.  See United 
States v. Patillar, 595 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (claiming that the conduct underlying the crime 
of larceny from the person “is violent and aggressive because it creates a significant risk of 
confrontation between thief and victim”).   
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law should err on the side of lenity to the defendant.281  Therefore, when 
forced to choose between the categorical approach and Begay, courts 
should strictly follow the categorical approach and, if necessary, minimize 
aspects of Begay. 
With these principles in mind, courts should disregard the ACCA 
precedent most at odds with the categorical approach: Begay’s “typically” 
language and James’s “ordinary case.”  Defining the scope of the residual 
clause by comparison to the enumerated crimes, Begay argued that the 
enumerated crimes all “typically involve” purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.  Elsewhere, Begay excluded a DUI as a violent felony 
because “statutes that forbid driving under the influence . . . typically do 
not insist on purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”  As explained 
above, the typical or ordinary commission of a crime is simply beyond the 
scope of the statutory elements required to convict a person for a crime.   
The “likely shooter” consideration from Begay should suffer the same 
fate.  Begay’s claim that purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct “is 
such that it makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will 
use that gun deliberately to harm a victim” merely illustrated its central 
test.  Contrary to the Court’s claim, the consideration is a judicial 
innovation rather than rooted in the statute’s title or text.282  Begay’s 
outcome did not turn on DUI’s incompatibility with that consideration.  
Therefore, courts should regard the “likely shooter” as descriptive dicta, 
which they are free to disregard in future cases.  Further, the consideration 
invites an imaginative application of the residual clause: could the court 
imagine an auto thief or a shoplifter using a gun to harm a victim in a later 
crime?  That question is likewise unrelated to the statutory elements of 
which the defendant was actually convicted.   
With the categorical approach as the lodestar, the only way to include 
more crimes that qualify as violent felonies under the plain text of the 
residual clause is to disregard the non-binding aspects of Begay’s 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test.  The apparent mandate that 
residual clause crimes require “purposeful” conduct is the weakest and 
most problematic part of Begay’s three-part test.  Begay applied its test to a 
strict liability crime, a New Mexico DUI conviction.  Begay only implied 
that crimes of recklessness and negligence cannot qualify as residual clause 
crimes without actually addressing any such crimes.  Therefore, the only 
rationale actually necessary to Begay’s result is that strict liability crimes 
                                                                                                                          
281 “Where it is reasonably avoidable, such indeterminateness is unacceptable in the context of 
criminal sanctions.  The rule of lenity, grounded in part on the need to give ‘fair warning’ of what is 
encompassed by a criminal statute, demands that we give this text the more narrow reading of which it 
is susceptible.”  James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 219 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. 
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)). 
282 See supra Part III.B. 
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are not violent felonies under the residual clause.283  Since Begay, the 
Court has not had the occasion to extend the “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive” test to crimes of recklessness and negligence.  Therefore, 
language purporting to require intentional conduct should be considered 
dicta.284  Nothing in the text of the ACCA provides any reason to limit the 
residual clause to intentional crimes.  Moreover, if the residual clause is 
defined by the characteristics of the preceding enumerated crimes, it is 
notable that one of those crimes, use of explosives, “may involve merely 
negligent or reckless conduct.”285  Furthermore, by including all crimes 
that pose a “serious potential risk of injury,” the residual clause plainly 
includes seriously dangerous crimes of negligence or recklessness.   
As discussed above, Judge Easterbrook has offered another way to 
reconcile the categorical approach and Begay’s apparent “purposeful” 
requirement.286  In Woods, Judge Easterbrook argued that intent as to a 
requisite act, instead of the natural consequences of the act, is sufficiently 
purposeful to qualify as a violent felony under Begay.  This argument’s 
greatest attraction is that it avoids ignoring a fairly clear direction (the 
“purposeful” requirement) from the Supreme Court.  Nonetheless, it may 
be too clever by half.  A mens rea of “purposely” usually requires that the 
offender intended a certain nature of conduct or the natural consequences 
of the act.287  The Indiana involuntary manslaughter statute at issue in 
Woods clearly did not qualify under the common concept of a purposeful 
mens rea.  The statute’s mens rea pertains only to the unintentional 
killing.288  Because the Indiana involuntary manslaughter statute obviously 
required reckless, not purposeful, conduct, Judge Easterbrook’s argument 
requires a unique definition of mens rea for the ACCA and the career 
offender guideline and another definition of mens rea for the rest of 
criminal law.  Such a maneuver, while helpful to this present problem, 
                                                                                                                          
283 See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test. 
284 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996) (“We adhere . . . not to mere 
obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established rationale upon which the Court based the results of its 
earlier decisions.  When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions 
of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.”). 
285 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 152 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
286 See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Easterbrook’s dissent 
in Woods.  
287 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of 
an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his 
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element 
involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes 
or hopes that they exist.”); see also Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 456 (2006) (“[T]he mens rea of conscious purpose requires that the 
defendant understand and intend the probable consequences of his actions.”).  
288 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3(a) (2010) (“A person who unintentionally kills an individual 
without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful 
which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and 
he performs them recklessly . . . . ” (emphasis added)). 
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turns the statute on its head and casts doubt on all statutes utilizing the 
common language of mens rea.   
Reading Begay as still including crimes of negligence or recklessness 
would give effect to the text of the ACCA and common sense rather than 
non-binding dicta.  Crimes like involuntary manslaughter, reckless 
endangerment, and negligent vehicular homicide would again qualify as 
violent felonies under the residual clause.  This interpretation would also 
resolve most of the tension between the ACCA and the career offender 
guideline.  If crimes of violence are not limited to purposeful crimes, then 
courts can give the guideline’s commentary its due and controlling weight. 
Begay’s requirements that a residual clause crime be categorically 
violent and aggressive are not so easily neglected.  The two requirements 
may have constituted dicta at the time of Begay because they were not 
necessary to the outcome of the case.  The Court could have disposed of 
the case based only on the strict liability of the New Mexico DUI statute.  
But if the requirements were dicta after Begay, Chambers eliminated that 
possibility.  Chambers held that a prior Illinois conviction for failure to 
report did not qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause.289  The 
statute at issue in Chambers required knowing conduct,290 so the Court 
could not dispose of the case on the same grounds as in Begay.  Rather, the 
crime failed to qualify for lack of violent conduct: “[A]n individual who 
fails to report would seem unlikely . . . to call attention to his whereabouts 
by simultaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful conduct.”291  
Though the Court’s discussion of likelihoods did not exemplify the 
categorical approach, Chambers certainly turned on the lack of violent 
conduct.  After Chambers, only crimes that require violent conduct may 
qualify as violent felonies.   
The impact of Begay’s “aggressive” requirement is still unclear.  
Chambers addressed the lack of aggressive conduct in the crime of failure 
to report just once in the opinion: “The behavior that likely underlies a 
failure to report would seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm 
than the less passive, more aggressive behavior underlying an escape from 
custody.”292  Although this comparison between failure to report and 
escape from custody may be correct as an “intuitive belief,”293 the Illinois 
statute does not actually require aggressive conduct for either crime.  
Neither Begay nor Chambers distinguished the aggressive requirement 
                                                                                                                          
289 Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 693 (2009). 
290 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (2010) (“A person convicted of a felony . . . who 
knowingly fails to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or 
knowingly fails to return from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to abide 
by the terms of home confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” (emphasis added)).  
291 Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692.   
292 Id. at 691.   
293 Id. at 692. 
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from the violent requirement.  Perhaps “aggressive” was a mere rhetorical 
flourish, not significantly different from “violent.”  Without further 
direction or any common criminal law definition for “aggressive,” courts 
may safely assume that crimes that require violent conduct also satisfy 
Begay’s “aggressive” requirement.294 
Of Begay’s “violent and aggressive” requirements, only “violent” is 
essential to crimes falling under the residual clause of the ACCA.  While 
this narrow reading of Begay includes many more crimes that pose a 
serious potential risk of physical injury, it carries two major disadvantages.  
First, if the residual clause includes only crimes with a statutory element of 
violence, such a reading arguably renders the residual clause superfluous 
because clause (i) of the “violent felony” definition already encompasses 
elements involving the use or threat of force.  Nonetheless, the residual 
clause is still broader than clause (i) because it also includes the “risk” of 
violence.  Second, this framework still excludes many sex crimes against 
children that do not require violent conduct even though the text of the 
residual clause arguably includes sex crimes against children.295  But both 
of these disadvantages spring from Begay, rather than this framework.  
Begay has effectively superceded the statutory text, requiring violence 
instead of only the serious risk of violence.  Lower courts should not 
consider hypothetical conduct outside the statutory elements of the prior 
conviction, even if this reading creates a statutory redundancy and fails to 
include many crimes that pose a serious potential risk of bodily injury.  
The hands of lower courts are tied until the Supreme Court reconsiders or 
recasts Begay, or Congress amends the ACCA.   
Courts should limit the residual clause inquiry to the fact of the 
conviction and the elements of the offense.  From that information, the 
court should determine whether the statute requires conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury: violent conduct that is committed 
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally.  If the statute of conviction is 
disjunctive, the court should examine the indictment, other charging 
documents, or any plea agreement or colloquy “‘only to determine which 
part of the statute the defendant violated.’”296  If neither the statute nor the 
charging documents indicate that the elements of the defendant’s crime of 
conviction required violence, then the court should not include the offense 
as a violent felony.  The court should limit its inquiry to these facts and 
documents.  It should not investigate the defendant’s uncharged conduct or 
speculate on the possibility that she could violently commit the crime.   
                                                                                                                          
294 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the “aggressive” 
requirement.   
295 See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of the “violent” requirement excluding sex crimes against 
children. 
296 United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Howell, 
531 F.3d 621, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2008)).   
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Imagine that the federal sentencing court had applied this approach to 
the case of Melvin Spells and his prior conviction for fleeing law 
enforcement.  A person can violate the Indiana statute in a number of 
ways.  Mr. Spells was convicted of the Class D felony version, which 
required that he used a vehicle to commit the offense or committed it in a 
dangerous manner.297  The sentencing court should have initially 
determined under which subsection he was convicted, using the 
indictment, other charging documents, or any plea agreement or colloquy, 
instead of the probable cause affidavit.298  If those documents did not 
clarify which crime the defendant committed, the categorical approach 
inquiry would normally end and the crime could not qualify as a violent 
felony.299  But if the documents showed that Mr. Spells was convicted of 
using a vehicle to resist law enforcement, it would then decide whether that 
crime is categorically violent—whether the statutory elements included 
violence and a mens rea of at least negligence.  The statute requires at least 
knowing or intentional conduct, so Begay’s prohibition of strict liability 
crimes does not disqualify it.  But the statute does not require violent 
conduct, so it should not have qualified as a violent felony under the 
residual clause.   
The hypothetical treatment of Mr. Spells’s case demonstrates both the 
costs and benefits of this Article’s proposal.  The costs are mostly policy-
based.  The complex categorical approach burdens and confuses courts.  
The crime of resisting law enforcement in a vehicle seems like it “presents 
a serious potential risk of bodily injury.”300  But these costs are worth 
bearing in light of the chief benefit: punishing a defendant based only on 
facts that the government actually had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
to secure a conviction, rather than based on the court’s imagination. 
                                                                                                                          
297 United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2008).  The offense of fleeing law 
enforcement is a  
Class D felony if: (A) . . . the person uses a vehicle to commit the offense; or (B) . . . 
the person draws or uses a deadly weapon, inflicts bodily injury on or otherwise 
causes bodily injury to another person, or operates a vehicle in a manner that creates 
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person.   
Id. at 749–50 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(b)).  
298 See id. at 748–50 (listing the procedures a court must follow in determining whether a crime 
constitutes a violent felony). 
299 The Seventh Circuit incorrectly skipped this step.  The sentencing court procedurally erred by 
consulting the probable cause affidavit to determine whether Mr. Spells used a vehicle to flee law 
enforcement.  Id. at 745–46, 750.  “Whether such a procedural violation occurred is only of 
significance if certain Class D felony violations of Indiana’s Resisting Law Enforcement offense would 
not constitute a ‘violent felony.’”  Id. at 750.  The court went on to decide whether using a vehicle to 
flee law enforcement is a violent felony, even though it was not clear whether Mr. Spells committed 
that crime.  Id.  
300 Id. at 748 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006)).   
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Consistency, fairness to the defendant, faithfulness to the text of the 
ACCA, and adherence to Supreme Court precedent all point toward the 
strict categorical approach and reading Begay as requiring that the residual 
clause crimes include statutory elements of “violence.”  Congress and the 
Supreme Court bear the most responsibility for the confusion surrounding 
the residual clause of the ACCA.  Congress should clarify the scope of the 
residual clause.  The Supreme Court should refine its approach with more 
precise opinions that hew closely to the text of the ACCA and prior 
precedent.  Until they act, however, lower courts have the tools to 
discharge their responsibilities to the Constitution, the law, and judicial 
precedent. 
